R+A- 212

Monograph No. 1

097.3
Z1092
No. 212

SECRET
~~OSS~~
~~SECRET~~
~~C.I.B.~~ 120582

CLASSIFICATION
Changed to
UNCLASSIFIED
by authority of
OIR/DRN
By MV
Oct. 17, 1949

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN OCCUPATION OF NORTHWEST AFRICA
OBJECTIVES AND COST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

December 3, 1941

Copy No. 3a

CLASSIFICATION
Changed to
UNCLASSIFIED

by authority of

By

SECRET

The Problem of
GERMAN OCCUPATION OF NORTHWEST AFRICA
OBJECTIVES AND COSTS

December 3, 1941

Coordinator of Information

The dismissal of Weygand and the suspension of the Economic Accord between the United States and North Africa have necessitated slight revisions in the original memorandum of November 12, 1941. The most important changes apply to Part I, B: Economic Objectives (reconsideration of the importance of cobalt, molybdenum, and olive oil) and Part IV: Timing.

The Problem of
GERMAN OCCUPATION OF NORTHWEST AFRICA
OBJECTIVES AND COSTS

Summary and Conclusion

I. Objectives

The positive military advantages to Germany of occupying Northwest Africa are considerable: first, in connection with the Mediterranean campaign; second, with respect to the South Atlantic counter-blockade; third, and less urgently, with respect to long run exploitation of areas bordering on the South Atlantic.

Equally, if not more important, would be the negative advantage of denying access to an important European flank and Mediterranean rear position.

Economically the advantages of occupation are at best slight in the short run, problematical in the long run. It should be noted, however, that even small increments to the present flow of North African cobalt and molybdenum are likely to be significant in terms of the present status of German mineral supply. Increases in the supply of olive oil would have less importance in the short run, since such increases would be offset by a probable decrease of peanut oil shipments from Dakar owing to Allied action in that region. Moreover, occupation would have the important negative advantage to Germany of preserving a considerable leak in the Allied blockade.

Politically, occupation would remove the last remaining important bargaining levers of France and Spain. There would be, for them, no real alternatives to full collaboration. Further, occupation might be the basis for significant strengthening of the morale of Italy.

Negatively, occupation would serve to insulate the politically vulnerable peoples of Southern Europe from Allied influence.

II. Costs

Military advice is to the effect that an action by Germany against Northwest Africa would take the form of a pincer movement through Spain and Tunisia. It is most unlikely that the Germans will move through Spain without Spanish collaboration or acquiescence. The force mobilized by the Germans would be of a size capable of overcoming full French resistance in Northwest Africa, whether or not that resistance is, in fact, expected. On these assumptions it is calculated that occupation would require roughly from nine to fourteen divisions and sufficient planes to achieve air superiority. The transport, landing, and subsequent supply of the required force, against the air and naval resistance available to the British and French in this theater would be a difficult but not insurmountable problem for Germany; this assumes Spanish collaboration or acquiescence and the maintenance of the existing supply facilities from Italian and Greek ports across the central Mediterranean.

The net political and economic costs of a campaign against Northwest Africa will vary considerably, depending upon the decision taken by Vichy with respect to collaboration. Other costs would include the loss of entrepôt supplies through Spain, Portugal, and the Canaries; the probable necessity of economic and territorial compensation to Spain and Spanish Morocco; the burden of occupying French Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria; and the cost of furnishing the goods not supplied by the country.

In addition, Germany must reckon with possible Allied occupation of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands; probable strengthening effect on American morale and unity, caused by German bases at Casablanca and in the Canaries.

III. Final Conclusion

The military and political advantages of occupying Northwest Africa seem to outweigh the probable and even the maximum costs to Germany.

IV. Timing

The timing of a German move into Northwest Africa is dependent largely on the success or failure of the present British offensive in Libya. The need of Tunisian ports, as supply bases for the Axis forces in Libya, might precipitate German military action, if these ports are not yielded voluntarily. A decisive British victory would endanger the potential control of the Germans over all of Northwest Africa. A British failure in the present campaign would make the Northwest African situation less urgent to the Germans; but it is unlikely that they will break off the chain of actions begun with the dismissal of Weygand until at least key strategic points in Northwest Africa have been occupied by German troops.

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Objectives 1-6
  A. Military Objectives 1
  B. Economic Objectives 3
  C. Political Objectives 4
  Conclusion 5

II. Costs 7-14
  A. Military Costs
    1. Troops and Equipment 7
    2. Transport and Supply 9
    Conclusion (Military) 10
  B. Probable Political and Economic Costs
    1. France 10
      (a) Vichy 10
      (b) French North Africa 12
      (c) The French Navy 12
      Conclusion (French) 12
    2. Spain 13
      Conclusion (Spanish) 14
    3. French Morocco 14
    Conclusion (Political and Economic) 15
  C. Disadvantages based upon Allied Reaction 15

III. Final Conclusion 15

IV. Timing 15-18

Appendix on West Africa 19-22

List of Supporting Studies 23

The Problem of
GERMAN OCCUPATION OF NORTHWEST AFRICA
OBJECTIVES AND COSTS

I. Objectives

A. Military Objectives

Occupation by Germany of Northwest Africa relates to four sections of the present war: the campaign against Britain in the Mediterranean; the campaign against Russia in the east; the counter-blockade against British shipping in the South Atlantic; the campaign for commercial and perhaps military power in the Western hemisphere and in West, Southwest, and South Africa.

1. Occupation of Northwest Africa would further the German campaign in the Mediterranean: (a) by providing a secondary defense position in case of a British victory in Libya; (b) by opening important new supply ports for Axis troops in Libya; (c) by completely closing the Mediterranean as a supply route to the British armies of the Middle East; (d) by neutralizing Gibraltar as a naval base and opening the Western Mediterranean to Axis commercial shipping; (e) by closing an exposed

rear position and eliminating the possibility of an Allied pincer movement in North Africa.

2. The Russian campaign affects German Northwest African strategy in two ways: (a) No voluntary move against Northwest Africa can be made if, during the coming months, the demands of the Russian War make the mobilization of a sufficient German striking force impossible; (b) If the Russian war is expected to continue on a large scale into 1942, it would be to the German advantage to deny the Northwest African coast to the Allies, as a potential base for attack on Southern Europe.

3. Occupation of Northwest Africa would further the counter-blockade in the South Atlantic: (a) by providing submarine bases at Casablanca and elsewhere on the coast; (b) by providing abundant facilities for land-based air attack on shipping; (c) by providing control of the Canaries, as a base within protective range of shore-based aircraft.

4. Occupation of Northwest Africa would be the first and perhaps decisive step in the long run German geopolitical program for attaining commercial and political hegemony in Latin

America, West, Southwest, and South Africa.

B. Economic Objectives

Pursuant to the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the strategic resources of Northwest Africa are now virtually under German control. Subsequent negotiation and maneuver have given Germany more direct control, especially with respect to olive oil, wheat, phosphates, molybdenum, cobalt, manganese, and the negligible native petroleum output. At the present time Northwest Africa is the decisive source of continental supply for olive oil, phosphates, and cobalt--all extremely scarce. Molybdenum and manganese resources are of considerable importance. The flow of Northwest African goods after occupation, as opposed to the present flow, will be determined by the following considerations:

1. The acquisition of any stock of cobalt, molybdenum, and other minerals which might have been denied to Germany by French political resistance.
2. The extent to which Germany will invest manufactured goods to regenerate the commercial, transport, agricultural, and mining facilities of North Africa.
3. The extent to which increased shipping

facilities will be made available to the Northwest African-South European routes.

4. The extent to which technicians and capital will be invested to discover and exploit suspected new mineral resources.
5. The extent to which present leaks (hoarding, non-European exports, black bourse operations, etc.) will be stopped.

Negatively, occupation would forestall the loss of very considerable agricultural and mineral supplies now flowing from Northwest Africa to the European continent. This loss would presumably follow upon a possible Allied occupation.

C. Political Objectives.

Successful occupation by Germany of Northwest Africa would achieve the following political objectives, favorable to the Axis effort:

1. The belief in ultimate Axis victory would be spread further throughout the Moslem world.
2. An end to the quasi-independent French state in Northwest Africa would remove an important residual French hope and bargaining lever; moreover, all of southern Europe would be forced into greater dependence on Germany, and, in the long run, probably into greater collaboration with Germany.

3. The elimination of the possibility of Allied occupation of Northwest Africa would forestall a potentially serious inroad on the morale of the New Order; for Allied occupation would create serious difficulties for Germany within France, Spain, and Portugal; and might cause a complete collapse of the Fascist regime within Italy.
4. The possible gift of Tunisia to Italy would significantly strengthen Italian morale.
5. German occupation of Northwest Africa would seriously affect the disposition of Latin America; through the full incorporation of Spain and Portugal in the New Order; through German occupation of African ports and air bases; through the acceptance of a strategic set-back by the Allies.

CONCLUSIONS: The positive military advantages to Germany of occupying Northwest Africa are very considerable: first, in connection with the Mediterranean campaign; second, with respect to the South Atlantic counter-blockade; third, and less urgently, with respect to long run exploitation of areas bordering on the South Atlantic. Equally, if not more important, would be the negative advantage of denying access to an important European flank and Mediterranean rear position.

Economically the advantages of occupation are at best slight in the short run, problematical in the long run. The maximum increment to occupied Europe of Northwest African supplies cannot be regarded as a significant factor in the German decision. Occupation would, however, have the important negative advantage of preserving a considerable leak in the Allied blockade.

Politically, the occupation would narrow the alternatives to full collaboration which are now available to France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal; in addition, occupation might be the basis for a significant strengthening of the morale of Italy.

II. Costs

The disadvantages of and obstacles to a German occupation of Northwest Africa are grouped as follows: (a) military costs; (b) probable political and economic costs; (c) disadvantages based on Allied reaction.

A. Military Costs

1. Troops and Equipment

Estimates of German force required to occupy Northwest Africa vary with the degree of resistance assumed. The maximum opposing force is the following:

(a) Spain - 500,000 to 550,000 troops (of which 194,000 have been reported in Morocco and 55,000 in the Canaries).

6 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 5 submarines

400 first line planes

(b) Portugal - 50,000 troops

3 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 3 submarines

150 planes

(c) France - 86,000 troops in unoccupied France
80,000 in North Africa

2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 11 cruisers, 25 flotilla leaders, 28 destroyers, 55 submarines (also damaged *Richelieu*, *Dunkerque*, partially complete *Jean Bart*) in European and Northwest African waters.

312 planes in unoccupied France
371 planes in North Africa.

There is, in addition, the British naval, land, and air force based on Gibraltar and Malta.

Under no circumstance foreseeable can it be assumed that the full force of this array will be thrown against a German attack. The Spanish and Portuguese metropolitan forces are, by most observers, expected to be passive. The Spanish colonial force, under the most likely conditions, must be counted a minor net addition to the German strength. Most estimates assume full, but ineffective, resistance by the British force at Gibraltar; full or partial resistance by the French force in Northwest Africa. Even if such resistance does not occur, it seems likely that the Germans will mobilize a force of occupation fully capable of dealing with it.

On this basis it is calculated that the occupation of Northwest Africa will require nine to fourteen divisions with a balanced air force sufficient to achieve air superiority, operating from Italian, Libyan, Spanish, and later, Spanish-Moroccan bases.

This campaign, according to military advice, will take the form of a pincer movement through Spain and Tunisia with the troops and planes about equally divided between the two arms of the pincer.[1] A British estimate on the length of time this operation would take calculates that about nine weeks would suffice. This assumes, however, full French resistance in Northwest Africa.

2. Transport and Supply.

The problem of transport and supply constitutes a difficult but not insurmountable problem to the Germans.

(a) Assuming full French resistance in Tunisia, it is calculated by the British that a month would be required to seize Tunisian ports, land, and concentrate five divisions. Adequate shipping and European ports of embarkation are available for this operation.

(b) Assuming Spanish acquiescence in Europe and Africa, it is calculated by the British that fully six weeks would be required to move five divisions from the Spanish-French frontier to consolidated positions in Spanish Morocco. Motor-road, railway, tanker, and ship transport facilities, though neither first class nor abundant, are available for this operation.[2]

---

[1] In case of Spanish resistance a British estimate states that fourteen German divisions would be required for the Spanish pincer.

CONCLUSION (Military): Assuming Spanish collaboration and full resistance by the French in North Africa, the occupation would require from nine to fourteen divisions, and sufficient planes to achieve air superiority. Assuming Spanish collaboration or acquiescence, and the maintenance of existing supply facilities in the Central Mediterranean, the transport and landing of the required force against the naval and air resistance available to the British and the North African French in this theater, and the subsequent supply of that force would be a difficult but not insurmountable problem for Germany.

B. Probable Political and Economic Costs.

1. France

If German diplomacy were to secure the full collaboration of Vichy and the Northwest African administration, the cost of occupation would consist merely of the diversion of the occupying force. Occupation would be almost immediately undertaken under these circumstances.

(a) Vichy

If Vichy refused to collaborate or submit politically to a German occupation of Northwest Africa, total occupation of France would probably follow. This would create the following difficulties for Germany:

---

[2] It is universally assumed that Gibraltar would be by-passed in the occupation of Northwest Africa and rendered useless as a naval base by artillery and air attack. The reduction of Gibraltar as a stronghold would be a lengthy and costly undertaking, to be launched by the Germans and Spanish at a later date, if at all.

(1) An enlarged occupation force and enlarged administrative responsibilities, over an increasingly restless population.

(2) The failure of the New Order in France would be demonstrated to occupied Europe.

(3) French North and West Africa and the French navy might be free to pursue an independent policy.

To forestall this situation the Germans could bargain powerfully with:

(a) a peace offer

(b) the French prisoners now held by Germany

(c) the political aspirations of Vichy collaborationists

(d) an offer of increased supply of food and of manufactured goods necessary for a higher standard of living

(e) further reduction of occupation costs.

Granted the strength of these bargaining powers Petain and the anti-collaborationists might accept the consequences of refusal if they know that the Allies were prepared to send a decisive force to Northwest Africa; and if they know that the French navy would either assist the Allies, or at least not collaborate with Germany.

(b) French North Africa

The removal of Weygand has reduced sharply the possibility of a unified, organized resistance to the Germans in North Africa. The only condition under which some of the North African forces might now resist is a decisive Allied victory. In this case many Frenchmen might prefer to fight with the British rather than with the Germans.

(c) The French Navy

It seems unlikely that the present French Naval Command would order collaboration with the British. The major condition under which it would order collaboration with Germany is the certainty of ultimate German victory.

CONCLUSION (French); If the Germans induce the French to collaborate, the political and economic costs will be negligible. If the Germans cannot induce the French to collaborate, the costs would be those listed above under the difficulties of full occupation of metropolitan France.

2. Spain

It may be assumed that Spain and Portugal will submit to, if not collaborate with, a German operation against Northwest Africa.[3] There are, nevertheless, the following irreducible costs to Germany of passage through Spain:

(a) Loss of Spain and Portugal as financial agents and entrepôts in Atlantic trade;

(b) Loss of petroleum products now stated to be flowing to the Canaries for use of German submarines;

(c) Loss of Lisbon as an observation and espionage center;

(d) Necessity to occupy and police minimal territory along the supply line and on the west flank (Portugal);

(e) Indirect loss consequent to shutting off Spain's current imports chiefly from Latin America and Britain.[4]

---

[3] There are reports at present that the Franco regime may even invite German occupation, in order to avoid alleged impending disorders over the Spanish food shortage.

If Germany should occupy Spanish Morocco, the loss of current imports would have even more severe economic consequences than in metropolitan Spain.

CONCLUSIONS (Spanish): All available evidence points to Spanish collaboration or acquiescence in a German move against Northwest Africa. There are, nevertheless, the considerable costs to Germany listed above. And although these are considerable, they cannot be regarded as costs sufficient to deter a German drive.

3. French Morocco.

Assuming German victory in French Northwest Africa certain minor costs would follow:

(a) the management of a widely dispersed population;

(b) the necessity for importing all manufactured supplies and petroleum products for the occupying force;

(c) the necessity of keeping in repair North African economy, partially revived lately by imports from America.

---

[4] To shut off these imports would worsen an already desperate situation in Spain. In order to preserve the form of Falangist New Order the Germans would probably offer some combination of food and notably oil supplies as well as promises of territory. The alternative would probably be the disintegration of the present Spanish regime, with damaging repercussions in Europe and South America.

CONCLUSIONS (Political and Economic): The net political and economic costs consequent to a campaign against Northwest Africa are those dependent upon Vichy's decision; the loss of entrepôt supplies through Spain, Portugal, and the Canaries; the probable necessity of economic and territorial compensation to Spain and Spanish Morocco; the burden of occupying French Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria; and the cost of furnishing the goods not supplied by the country.

C. Disadvantages Based upon Allied Reaction

1. Possible Allied occupation of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.
2. Probable strengthening effect on American morale, unity, and action caused by German bases at Casablanca and in the Canaries.

III. Final Conclusion.

The military and political advantages of occupying Northwest Africa far outweigh the probable and even the maximum costs.

IV. Timing.

The timing of a German move into Northwest Africa is dependent largely on the success or failure of the present British offensive in Libya. The need of Tunisian ports, as supply bases for the Axis forces in Libya, might precipitate German military action, if these ports are not yielded voluntarily. A decisive British victory would endanger the potential control of the Germans over all of Northwest Africa. A British failure in the present campaign would make the Northwest African situation less urgent to the Germans; but it is unlikely that they will break off the chain of actions begun with the dismissal of Weygand until at least key strategic points, in Northwest Africa, have been occupied by German troops.

A. The following strategic factors argue that German action against Northwest Africa may come in the near future.

  1. The inadequacies of the Libyan ports to supply the Axis forces sufficiently for a lengthy campaign. This inadequacy, caused to a large degree by recent Allied air and sea actions, might necessitate the occupation of Tunisian ports, with or without French permission.
  2. A decisive British victory would endanger the actual and potential control of the Germans over all of Northwest Africa, and consequently force the Germans to undertake a campaign which they had hoped to postpone at the present time.
  3. The possibility of a winter lull in the campaign in Russia would permit the liberation of the necessary German forces.
  4. The increased productivity of war industries in the United States and the increased naval activity in the North Atlantic have the effect of lightening the patrol duties of the British

navy, increasing the volume of American deliveries to Britain, and possibly releasing British tonnage. This may increase German fear of the Allies anticipating the German occupation of Northwest Africa.

B. The following strategic factors argue that German action against Northwest Africa may be delayed.

1. German commitments in Russia, the Middle East, and Libya:

   According to military advice present developments in these theatres indicate that the Germans will probably be reluctant to open a new military front. At the same time it should be noted that the permission to establish German consulates in key cities of Northwest Africa, and the ousting of Weygand might be interpreted as the beginning of a diplomatic offensive which may result in Germany's freedom to use Bizerta, Oran, and Casablanca as air and submarine bases.

2. Political crises in France and Spain might be precipitated by a German occupation of Northwest Africa. Vichy's psychological and economic collaboration with Germany is based on the hope of a partnership in the new European Order. The chances of realizing these hopes would be damaged

by the probable German promise of French colonial territory to both Italy and Spain. Such a division of the French Empire might seriously curtail France's present industrial contribution to the Nazi war machine. A German occupation of Spain might hurt Spanish pride and the promised German rewards would probably fall short of Spanish ambitions.

3. A failure of the British campaign in Libya would remove all Allied threats to Northwest Africa in the immediate future and might postpone full German military occupation.

APPENDIX

West Africa

Full collaboration of the French with the Germans would extend German occupation automatically from North to West Africa and necessitate no further discussion. Serious difficulties for the Germans, however, would be created by the resistance of the West African command to full collaboration.

Assuming this resistance the conquest of Dakar might be attempted if the Germans should have the French fleet at their disposal. Barring this possibility, however, it seems most likely that the extension of German control to West Africa would not follow immediately upon the conquest of French North Africa. The factors indicating the postponement of a German West African campaign are more substantial than those which argue for immediate action.

A. Factors arguing for the postponement of a German West African campaign.

1. The operation against Dakar would be extremely difficult.

Dakar at the present time is considered impregnable by sea to anything less than a major naval and military expedition. Its defenses consist of more than 50,000 troops and 100 planes (of late frequently reenforced by shiploads of men and modern equipment), powerful coastal batteries, the guns of the stationary Richelieu and an efficient naval force of two cruisers, four flotilla leaders, one destroyer and twelve submarines. Only the cooperation of the Vichy fleet with the Germans might disorganize these defenses sufficiently to make a comparatively easy conquest possible. Barring this possibility, the Germans would be forced to take the land-air route from Marrakesh to Dakar, a distance of about 1740 miles. Most of this route consists of a track through the Western Sahara, rough, hot, and short of water. Before troops and materials could pass over it in any quantity, supply dumps would have to be established and considerable road improvement carried out. The same considerations apply to the establishment of air bases.

2. German control of the Moroccan ports and the Canaries would suffice for the time being seriously to jeopardize British-bound shipping on the north-south lane.

At the present time British convoys assemble at or near Freetown and proceed north through the eastern reaches of the Atlantic. To interrupt this traffic the Germans would have available in Morocco the excellent harbors of Casablanca (accommodation for a naval force of three battleships, a squadron of cruisers, and two flotillas of destroyers; 10,000 feet of quayage for 23-feet-draught vessels, modern equipment) and Tangier (not so well developed, but better protected from southwest winds and swells) as well as the eight minor harbors of Agadir, Mogador, Safi, Fedala, Rabat, Wadi Sebout, Larache, and Arcila, of which Agadir has the greatest possibilities, if developed further, as a potential submarine base. These ports, however, lie somewhat to the northeast of the optimum zone of submarine operations. Consequently, the Germans would probably occupy the two good ports of the Canary Islands, Las Palmas and Santa Cruz, about 630 miles southwest of Casablanca. Using these bases, the new German submarines with an operating range of 8000 to 10,000 miles, supplemented by observation planes and surface raiders, could quite easily make the present British supply route untenable. An expensive diversion of shipping to the West and from there to the North Atlantic route would be the minimum cost inflicted upon the British.

3. Dakar's use as a submarine and air base would depend upon the ability of the Germans to supply it. This supply would be extremely difficult without the cooperation of the French fleet or the execution of a vast road building program.
4. An Allied occupation of Dakar, on the other hand, would constitute no danger of Allied operations against the German position in North Africa.
5. In case the Germans should need Dakar for an extension of the battle of the Atlantic, their possession of Northwest Africa would give them a geographical advantage over any other power.

B. Factors arguing for the imminence of a German West African campaign.

1. West African peanut oil is important to the continental economy. A German occupation of Dakar would provide a better protected sea route from Dakar to Casablanca and also prevent the possible loss of this source of supply to the Allies.
2. The Germans desire additional well protected air, submarine, and raider bases, not only to interfere with the British use of Bathurst and Freetown as convoy and naval bases but also to servo as a constant threat to Latin America.

3. The Germans might choose to move at once in order to avoid a costlier future campaign in case Allied forces should reenforce the French West African garrison.
4. The Germans desire to deny the Allies the chance to acquire another good naval and convoy base on the bulge of Africa.

These latter factors, serious as they are, do not seem great enough to force the Germans to undertake an immediate attack on Dakar. The Germans can well afford to leave the problem unsolved until they are ready to extend the area of their hegemony over Africa and South America.

Supporting Studies

1. North African Chronology since the Fall of France.
2. German "Eurafrican" Objectives as Developed in Geopolitical Theory.
3. The Problem of Vichy.
4. The German Political and Economic Problems in Iberia.
5. Germany's Economic Stake in French North and West Africa.
6. The Military Problems of a German Conquest of Northwest Africa.

NORTH AFRICAN CHRONOLOGY
SINCE THE FALL OF FRANCE

MEDITERRANEAN SECTION

This chronology has been compiled from newspaper sources, principally the *New York Times*. It lists most of the events and significant rumors dealing with Western Mediterranean problems. Unless otherwise indicated all the listed items are from the *New York Times*.

These reports have been classified for clarity's sake into those concerning:

(1) The Axis and the Western Mediterranean.
(2) France and its African Colonies.
(3) Spain and its Colonies.

NORTH AFRICAN CHRONOLOGY SINCE THE FALL OF FRANCE

Date 1940	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
June 6		Marcel Peyrouton appointed Resident-General of Tunisia; reputation as strong and able veteran colonial administrator indicates peril of Empire.	
June 16			Spanish communiqué reveals Spanish Moroccan troops have taken over Tangier; action taken in agreement with Britain, France, and Italy to guarantee Zone's neutrality; Madrid demonstrators hail move, demand Zone for Spain; Italians hail Tangier occupation; Berlin sources deny Allies agreed to occupation; Hull says U.S. will maintain extra-territorial rights. Powers are assured that international status will continue.
June 22	France agrees to accept terms of Compiegne armistice.		
June 24	French ordered to demilitarize Toulon, Bizerta, Ajaccio, Oran, and strip of territory, bordering on Libya, under Italian armistice terms; French civil authorities remain in charge. Fighting ceases.		
June 25		Resident-General Noguès pledges defense of North Africa against foreign invasion, in radio speech; interpreted by some to suggest resistance to policy of surrender.	Madrid press utters demands for Gibraltar and French Morocco.
June 26		Fear of colonial defection a cause for new Empire appointments, including that of Pierre Boisson as Governor-General of French West Africa. Daladier and others detained at Casablanca at Noguès' order. Events begin to indicate that despite British urging, civil, military, and naval units in French North Africa will follow Pétain policy and cease fighting.	
June 28		Noguès, Governor Le Beau of Algeria, and Peyrouton all declare loyalty to Pétain. General Gourand reported sent to Morocco with appeal to Noguès, from Weygand, and with instructions to be prepared to take over if Nogues refused to accept armistice. Naval commanders said to be uniformly loyal to Pétain policy.	

Date 1940	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
July 3		French fleet units in British ports put under British control; conditions offered to French warships in North African ports; British report attack on French ships at Oran after conditions were refused.	
July 4		British sink French battleship, seaplane carrier, two destroyers, and damage two new battle cruisers and one older battleship in fight off Oran lasting 1½ hours; fight followed Admiral Gensoul's refusal to accept British terms; French battleship *Dunkerque* or *Strasbourg* escapes to Toulon or other French port on African coast; French Committee in London says no French capital ship has fallen into German or Italian hands.	
July 5		French government breaks with Britain over Oran attack; French ships in Oran ordered home; Minister Baudouin attacks Churchill, says French fleet unable to defend self; Britain warns of blockade against France; 1,000 casualties reported in Oran battle. A French plane attack on Gibraltar reported.	
July 6		Britain reports naval planes crippled battleship *Dunkerque* off Algeria; France moves to defend fleet from British pursuit; freed temporarily by Germany and Italy from obligation to disarm in the Mediterranean.	
July 8		British report successful attack on French battleship *Richelieu*; Havas news agency reports hits on British battle cruiser *Hood* and damaging of two British destroyers in battle with French off Mars-el-Kebir.	
		Franco-British break made formal. French London embassy members say if Britain had held fire, French crews would have scuttled ships; General de Gaulle tells British not to gloat over Oran victory, but defends British action in broadcast to France; British deny French charge that British machine-gunned French crews and contention that French intended to demilitarize ships in unoccupied French ports.	

Date 1940	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
July 9	Rome *Telegrafo* admits Britain destroyed 1/3 of French fleet and seized 1/3; says French naval bases in North Africa will be used against Britain.		
July 10		Britain lists Algeria, French Morocco, and Tunisin as enemy territory.	
July 14		Churchill offers British aid to French possessions cut off from France but maintaining their freedom.	
July 17			Generalissimo Franco voices Spain's demand for Gibraltar and African expansion; Spanish press urges uniting French and Spanish Morocco, under Spain.
July 19		Admiral J. M. Abrial, "hero of Dunkerque" replaces LeBeau as Governor-General of Algeria.	
July 21		Noguès and Sultan Sidi Mohammed of Morocco pledge loyalty to Pétain government.	
July 26		Vice-Admiral Esteva, commander of French maritime forces in the South, appointed Resident-General of Tunisia, replacing Peyrouton, who returns to France. (London *Times*, July 27, 1940)	
July 31		British consuls at Marrakesh and Fez told to leave.	At Tangier, Spanish forces bring pressure to bear on International Assembly to replace French administrator with Señor Amieva, Spanish minister and head of local Falange.
Aug. 3	French charged armed British patrol landed in Cameroons. British counter with report of the escape of the Polish steamer *Kroman* from Dakar, where the authorities allegedly tried to hold her "till the Germans came."		
Aug. 22	General de Gaulle accuses Vichy Government of sending 800 planes from French African colonies to Germany; denied.		
		General Vergez to command French troops in Morocco, General Audet in Tunisia. Verges replaces Noguès, retired from military command for age but remaining as Resident-General of Morocco.	

Date	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
1940 Aug. 27 - Nov. 17		Free French win over all of Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons, supported by British offer of economic aid to colonies which fight on. Vichy drops several governors, forbids assemblies. Revolt reported stirring in French West Africa and Morocco, where harsh measures are applied against "traitors."	
Sept. 3		Pétain in broadcast to French empire urges support of Vichy government; French strengthen rule in French Morocco by reorganization. 19 French planes land at Gibraltar, having escaped from Morocco.	
Sept. 7		Vichy government sends General Weygand to French Africa as Delegate-General to direct all military and administrative activity; Platon, Secretary for Colonies; Huntziger War Minister.	
		Weygand's powers: "He has power to provoke, and, if need be, take all measures of urgency necessitated by the military security of the territories of French Africa."	
Sept. 11		6 French warships pass through Gibraltar Straits without British interference; non-interference a mystery; French government says warships headed for Dakar. Cruisers: *Georgas Leyguis*, *Gloire*, *Montcalm*. Destroyers: *L'Audacieux*, *Le Malin*, *Fantasque*.	
Sept. 14		French governmental system in Tunisia reorganized by Resident-General Esteva, with approval of Sidi Ahmed Bey.	
Sept. 16 ff.			Serrano Suñer in Berlin as Spanish special convoy, sees Hitler, Ribbentrop; African partition reported discussed.

Date 1940	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
Sept. 21		German radio reports British attack on French naval squadron off Dakar. Truth seems to be that 6 French warships put out to sea with the declared intention of convoying some merchant ships back to France, but the British fearing they might be planning interference in Gaullist Equatorial Africa, intercepted them, sent all but one back to Dakar (one went to Casablanca for repairs).	
Sept. 22	*Popolo d' Italia* says French and Belgian African possessions must be "resystematized"; reveals Axis conference on post-war distribution of African colonies among Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.		
Sept. 23		British fleet shells Dakar after rejection of landing ultimatum for British-Free French expeditionary force led by General de Gaulle; French Foreign Minister Baudouin says Vichy government will resist, assails de Gaulle. 35,000-ton battleship *Richelieu*, injured earlier, joins recently-arrived squadron in defense. De Gaulle's objectives as yet unclear: to thwart German penetration? to capture colony for "Free France"? or to get warships? Vichy says Dahomey, Togo, Ivory Coast, Madagascar will remain loyal to Pétain, but admits "dissidence" of Equatorial Africa and Cameroons.	
Sept. 24		De Gaulle fails to find expected support in Dakar, 6 attempts to land fail. Only then does "protective" British squadron join in shelling. French lose 2 submarines; 300 casualties reported.	
Sept. 25		Seeing that only after a major engagement, (with shedding of much French blood) can Dakar be taken, De Gaulle persuades British to withdraw with him. Meanwhile, Petain and Darlan have assailed Britain in Vichy, and a French air squadron has bombed Gibraltar in reprisal. Vichy reiterates that there are no Germans in French West Africa. Vichy officials reported pleased at Dakar results; believe French resistance and Gibraltar raids responsible for British withdrawal; see de Gaulle discredited; admit loss of destroyer *Audacieux* at Dakar; Governor-General Boisson praised.	

Date 1940	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
Sept. 30			Serrano Suñer visits Rome.
Oct. 4		General Weygand to leave for Dakar to organize African defense (arrival reported October 28).	
Oct. 17			Serrano Suñer, administrative head of Spain's *Falange*, Minister of Government with broad powers, and recently Franco's special envoy to Rome and Berlin, replaces Col. Beigbedor as Foreign Minister. Known to be pro-Axis.
Oct. 23			Hitler conference with Franco on French-Spanish border.
Oct. 24	Hitler and Laval confer; "collaboration" rumors evoke U. S. warning; talk of Franco-German peace and end of occupation in return for bases, some warships, token colonial distributions; Spain to be rewarded.		
Oct. 30		Vichy government decrees suppression of general councils and local assemblies in colonies; colonial governors alone to be responsible.	
	Madrid sources report General Noguès in Morocco will resist if Vichy orders surrender to Spain and Axis; Germans deny rumors that their troops are in Spain.		
Nov. 2	Germans are reported displeased at Weygand's speech pledging firm French colonial stand; fear lest French firmness cause Spain to reconsider.		
Nov. 4-5			Tangier is formally incorporated into Spanish Morocco. Col. Antonio Yuste abolishes International Committee of Control, Legislative Assembly, Mixed Office of Information; makes himself Military Governor, responsible to High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco (General Carlas Ascensio), Spanish Administrator, appointee of Assembly on July 31, dismissed. Spanish *peseta* made legal currency of Zone. British reserve rights, indicate they expect Franco to refuse requests for German troop transit.
Nov. 9			International gendamerie abolished, Spain takes over Zone's internationalized commercial status; Britain "assumes" Spain does not intend to fortify Zone. Italian submarines reported undergoing repairs in port.

Date 1940	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
Nov. 9-12		De Gaulle forces attack Librèville, capital of Gabun in French Equatorial Africa. By November 17, the last Vichy stronghold in Gabun is taken and the Free French hold all Equatorial Africa (See Aug. 27 - Nov. 17)	
		Rumors that Weygand's failure to return to France indicate his intention of resisting Vichy policy; Vichy denies having called him home.	
		Platon, Esteva, Abrial and Weygand confer in Algiers; then Platon sees Pétain, Noguès and Huntziger in Vichy.	
Nov. 15		French Merchant Marine reports imports from North Africa, Casablanca, and Dakar near peace-time level in September 15-October 15 period.	
	D. N. B. says recently signed economic pact between Vichy and Germany includes French Colonies and protectorates.		
	Popolo d' Italia threatens Axis military action if Vichy Government fails to stop De Gaulle's African expeditionary force.		
Nov. 16	50 German police officers enroll in Italian colonial police school at Tivoli for training in African patrol work; more to follow.		
Nov. 23			Spain completes incorporation of Tangier into Spanish-Morocco Protectorate. Cabinet approves judicial law recognizing incorporation. High Commissioner assumes control of all Zone's services.
Dec. 7			Franco confers with French Ambassador Piétri, warns against opposition to Spain's colonial aspirations.
Dec. 8	De Gaulle urges French fleet and French armies in North Africa and Syria to join British against Italians, in broadcast.		

Date	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
1940			
Dec. 12		Weygand in Jay Allen interview claims his role as Delegate-General of Pétain to French Africa is being misrepresented in British, American press; denies rift with Pétain. French reported breaking British blockade by convoying ships from Algeria through Gibraltar; British show restraint.	
Dec. 21		Vichy government organizes 6 economic committees to handle colonial activities and prevent foreign economic domination. Export licenses to be issued, other control measures instituted.	French consul-general in Tangier refuses to hand over customs house control; Tangier natives protest food situation; instructed by Sultan, Mendoub calls on Spanish military governor Yuste, asks clarification of situation. (Mendoub is Sultan of Morocco's representative in the Zone, nominally controls native affairs.) British Consul-General protests dismissal of British officials in Zone's administration.
Dec. 25		Weygand recall to Vichy denied; retains full confidence of Vichy government; tours African empire inspecting defenses.	
1941			
Jan. 1-2	Rumor that Pétain's threat to take his Government to Africa and resume fight is holding off complete German occupation of France.		Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer says occupation and subsequent incorporation of Tangier was "to forestall other claimants" to a region vital to Spain. British negotiate with Spain on Tangier commercial status, using her potential blockading power to win interim agreement on preservation of her subjects' rights.
Jan. 9		Rear Admiral Platon defies any challenge to French empire; accuses Britain of wanting French colonies as barter instruments; attacks de Gaulle.	
Jan. 23	De Gaulle charges German plan to land troops in French African base of Bizerta, to go to aid of Italians, against whom Free French troops have joined British forces.		
Jan. 31	Gen. de Gaulle appeals to Weygand forces in radio speech to join Free French forces in Libya conquest. Rumor that real difficulty of Franco-German collaboration is Weygand's refusal to return to France from Africa. Vichy says no formal bid for African bases.		

Date 1941	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
Feb. 1	Weygand in radio speech in Algiers urges French African troops to support Pétain and not to heed appeals to enter war against Italy; rejects de Gaulle plea for war aid.		
Feb. 7	Weygand says French will never agree to occupation of Bizerta or any other part of Tunisia in Algerian broadcast.		
Feb. 10-12	Franco and Serrano Suñer go to Italy to confer with Mussolini; Pétain leaves Vichy to confer with Franco after latter's conference with Mussolini; Franco and Serrano Suñer and Mussolini confer at Bordighera; complete identity of Italian-Spanish views announced.		
Feb. 13	Pétain and Franco confer at Montpellier; Serrano Suñer confers with Darlan; Tunis discussed? Vichy reports Franco refused war entry bid.		
		Weygand reported refusing Italians permission for fleeing Libyan army to enter Tunisia.	
Feb. 17		Governor-General J. M. Abrial asserts Algeria's loyalty to Pétain government.	
Feb. 18	French-Italian economic pact including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia concluded; Italian goods get minimum tariffs.		
Feb. 19		General Odic appointed supreme commander of French air forces in French North Africa; new unification thus achieved.	
Feb. 25		Paris *Matin* links de Gaulle's attack with French gold reserve in Dakar.	
Feb. 26			British Undersecretary Butler reveals British-Spanish "interim" accord on Tangier, providing (1) No fortification of Zone (2) A consular court to replace the mixed international court (3) Compensation for dismissed international officials. British rights, press, other institutions protected.
Mar. 5-11		General Weygand reports to Pétain in Vichy on French African empire; Pétain reaffirms his faith in Weygand; March 11 Weygand returns to African post. First trip to France since September.	
Mar. 6	Germans take over French Moroccan duties as Italian commission members leave; Germans reported controlling Tangier by sending "technicians." Not more than 60 Germans reported in Morocco; other reports disagree.		
Mar. 8		General revision of French colonial administration forecast, with Weygand taking over posts of Esteva and Abrial in Algeria and Tunisia.	

Date	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
1941 Mar. 11			Generalissimo Franco bars German plan to fly planes across Spain to Africa, says report.
Mar. 14	British agree to easing of blockade of North Africa on assurances of no German infiltration into French Africa.		
Mar. 16-17			Spain ousts Mendoub Si Mohammed Tazzi from office in Tangier; palace to be used as German consulate as before World War; Si Larbi Tensamani, successor of Mendoub, takes office; completely controlled by Spanish authorities. New native potentate not responsible to Sultan but to Califf of Spanish Morocco and Spanish authorities. New aggressive policy seen, now that negotiation with British concluded.
Mar. 30		French shore batteries in Nemours, Algeria and British warships trade shots when British squadron attempts to halt convoy of 4 French ships escorted by a French destroyer. Later, when British squadron on way back to Gibraltar French bombers attack it. Convoy escapes, British claim they refrained from firing on it. French protest, denying British right to interfere with ships carrying non-military goods; say convoy was attacked. Hitherto British have applied blockade leniently to French ships.	
Apr. 7		Pétain in radio speech urges national unity, support of Darlan and rules out action against British.	
Apr. 12		"Pertina" charges Weygand has allowed himself to be seriously weakened in North Africa, now has only 125,000 men, less than 100 planes, lack of gas and other raw materials, food-stuffs. Credit Italian Armistice Commission with a thorough job of disarming Libyan border. Trained Germans now infiltrating with new German Armistice Commission, size of which is expanding. (N.Y. *Times*, April 12, 22)	
Apr. 22	Persistent reports that Hitler is demanding right of transit for German troops across Spain. Franco reported refusing, Serrano Suñer reported favoring it; Vichy denies Hitler demand for troop passage through unoccupied France.		

Date	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
1941 May 2			Spanish authorities at Tangier require all citizens of German-occupied countries to get German permission to leave Zone.
May 3		Robert D. Murphy sent back to French North Africa as State Department's observer; talk of sending U. S. food there if assured that it won't get to German hands, and that Empire won't be included in "collaboration." British opposed to it up to now, Axis forces in Libya being so near.	
May 5			Spain takes over Tangier custom service; Britain continues efforts for Spanish-British trade deal; Madrid press renews demands for French Morocco and Algeria.
May 11			Lieutenant General Luis Orgaz replaces General Ascensio as high commissioner of Spanish Morocco, also commander in chief of troops there. June 5 Colonel Yuste replaced by Colonel Granados as military governor of Tangier.
May 14, ff.	First reports of German infiltration into Syria, including use of airdromes. Suggests new forms of collaboration; U. S. joins Britain in warning France against further concessions to Axis in North or West Africa.		
		Meanwhile, French Air Minister General Bergeret reported inspected air defenses throughout French Africa.	
	Eden charges Vichy permits German torpedo boats to pass down Rhone River to Mediterranean.		
May 22		France moves to strengthen Dakar defenses, with new guns, new anti-aircraft, etc. Garrison supposed to be 5000 men, with less than 100 planes. The now-repaired *Richelieu*, 3 destroyers, 3 cruisers, several submarines, make up naval defense.	
May 28, ff.	British planes pursuing Libya-bound Italian convoy hit French and Italian ships in Sfax harbor, Tunis; further strain on British relations with Vichy; also raid on Aleppo; Syria and Lebanon called enemy areas. 3 raids on Sfax.		
	British end issuance of navicerts to French ships.		

Date 1941	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
June 2-3		Weygand, Petain confer on colonial and Syrian situation.	
June 4	French deny British reports that U-boats have arrived in Dakar or that Germans are using French naval bases.		
June 7	Weygand gets complete supervision of colonial policy; reported to have blocked outright military collaboration with Germany; said to oppose diverting forces to reconquer Free French acquisitions; is promised status quo in North Africa, report says.		
June 8- July 12		Free French and British take Syria.	
June 22		Weygand condemns invasion of Syria in bitter speech at Casablanca.	
June 28, ff.		U. S. - French, North Africa pact announced, French will get oil, etc. British had assented in early Spring, then withdrew assent, now agree to it again with misgivings; have released tanker *Scheherezade*, carrying oil to Casablanca, captured and taken to Bermuda when British revoked its navicert in May. Pact restricted to French Africa, and to non-military goods; Murphy there to insist on strict compliance with terms no reshipments to Europe. Considered a sort of bribe for Weygand to forestall North African "collaboration" by easing economic stringency. 4 French ships to shuttle between U. S. and Casablanca, will bring U. S. strategic materials. 1st shipment includes clothing, tea, sugar. Later machinery, oil, etc. U. S. to get cork, olive oil, red squill, perfume oils, gum arabic, salt fluorine, tartar, sheep casings. Pact extended to Dakar, Senegaw, July 22. (See also note on Sept. 24,28)	
July 12	French deny Germans aid defense work at Casablanca, Dakar, and Mers-el-Kebir; assert defense activity due to U. S. occupation proposals; (Lisbon press warns U. S. on attacking Azores)		
July 13		Vichy reported in joint West African defense talks with Spain and Portugal, by Turin paper. Noguès reported present.	
July 16		General Weygand succeeds Admiral Abrial as Governor-general of Algeria.	

Date 1941	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
July 19		Darlan appoints Vice-Admiral Jacques Fenard as Weygand's secretary and his (Darlan's) liaison man at Weygand's headquarters.	
July 20		French warn U. S. of Dakar and Morocco strength; stress Weygand military forces; warn any aggression will be resisted; Speech by Boisson pledges to defend Dakar.	
July 23			General Fernando Barron Ortiz succeeds General Munoz Grande as Military Governor of Algeciras area, adjacent to Gibraltar.
July 27	German-controlled Paris press launches campaign for French-German military pact for defense of Dakar and other French African areas.		
		Vichy troops to be moved from conquered Syria to French Morocco, many Senegalese and Foreign Legionnaires to join Free French but most Frenchmen decide to remain loyal to Vichy.	
Aug. 5		Vichy decree orders General Weygand to submit North African general policy questions to Vice-Premier Darlan.	
Aug. 8		Mendigal replaces Odic as air chief in North Africa, Noguès applies anti-Jewish rules in Morocco; Weygand arrives in Vichy to discuss general situation.	
Aug. 15		General de Gaulle appoints General P. Le Gentilhomme Free French commander in chief in French Africa.	Recurrent reports of German troops passing through Spain to North Africa.
Aug. 26		General Juin, released from German prison camp, returns to former post as assistant to commander of Moroccan troops.	
Aug. 27		General Juin replaces Vergez as commander in chief of troops in Morocco; General Delattre de Tassigny for Audet in Tunisia, and General Koeltz for Benays in Algeria. At same time, Admiral Auphan put in command of French fleet.	

Date 1941	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
Aug. 28		General Huntziger to command all North African troops, apparent lessening of Weygand's authority. *(Christian Science Monitor*, August 29)	
Sept. 2	German-controlled Paris press accuses U. S. of filtering "tourists" into African territories, including the region surrounding Dakar, (Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.) and of showing an unnatural interest in the trans-Saharan Railway.		
Sept. 4		Vichy grants funds for work on Dakar base and its overland communications with Mediterranean. Improving Dakar-Niger Railroad and completing a trans-Saharan highway system. Work continues on railroad to Colomb Bechar in Algeria, which is connected by narrow gauge to the Mediterranean. Also, work on new base at Abidjan, French Ivory Coast port development, with Dakar it will flank British port of Freetown in Sierra Leone.	
Sept. 12	Talk of joint German-French-Spanish defense of West Africa from U. S.; Britain, tri-power staff talks at Melilla, Morocco reported to have resulted in the setting up of a permanent joint staff. Flow of German arms to French Morocco, Spanish Rio de Oro, and Dakar. Foreign Legionnaires sent to Dakar. Portugal included? Article in *Journal Echo de Paris* hints at major German-Italian offensive in Mediterranean, possibly in Spain.		
Sept. 16		Noguès, Esteva, Boisson, Dentz come to Vichy in close succession for conferences. Esteva confident of Tunisia's "loyalty", despite economic stringencies.	
Sept. 22		On eve of anniversary of Dakar attack, Gen. Boisson in Vichy renews pledge to defend Colony against all comers, reiterates that there are no Germans in Dakar.	

Date	*The Axis and the Western Mediterranean*	*France and its African Colonies*	*Spain and its Colonies*
1941 Sept. 24-28		N. Y. *Herald-Tribune* report on supplies received in North Africa under U. S. - Weygand pact, paid for by unfreezing credits. No military equipment sent, but tar (for roads), iron wire, coal, textiles, fuel oil, kerosene, farm machinery, twine, tea, tobacco, and sugar; all under U. S. license. $12,000,000 so far (some to Martinique) State Department apparently plans $12,000,000 worth quarterly in future. Risks: Germans might get it, by transshipment or in Morocco. Reported Weygand has 200,000 well trained troops,--true? Also, it is true that Weygand has been tough with German "tourists" and prohibited contacts between armistice commissions and Arabs? Imports relieving the native agitation. Note, however, that armistice commission has weakened Bizerta defense and demilitarized Libyan line.	
Oct. 24	Nazis said to seek Weygand ouster; reported urging Vichy to make General Dentz, ex-Syria chief, commander in Africa; continued German suspicion of Weygand.		

SECRET

GERMAN "EURAFRICAN" OBJECTIVES AS DEVELOPED IN GEOPOLITICAL THEORY

Geography Division

(Compiled with the assistance of
the Mediterranean and
Western European Sections)

SECRET

GERMAN "EURAFRICAN" OBJECTIVES

AS DEVELOPED IN GEOPOLITICAL THEORY

Summary and Conclusion

A. The importance of geopolitics in German military plans has not been definitely established. It is possible that Haushofer is an important adviser to the General Staff and that geopolitical concepts are taken seriously in high quarters in Germany. It is certain that one of the aims of the Geopolitical Institute is to influence Germans and foreigners to support German military and economic imperialism.

B. German plans for Africa deal not only with the restoration of the German colonies but also with the organization of Eurafrica, which will accomplish the political and economic integration of the two continents.

C. German regional plans for Africa have also been elaborated.

1) The conquest of North and West Africa is considered the "logical next step" in German strategy, for the control of Dakar and Casablanca or of the Vigo-Canaries-Azores triangle would cut the British supply route from the Cape. In the long run Germany is expected to replace France in the exploitation of North Africa.

2) South and East Africa are to be settled and developed by the Germans in cooperation with the Boers.

3) The Western Mediterranean is to be the preserve of a Spain, which, dominated by Germany, will serve as a decoy for Latin America and as a German sentinel at Gibraltar. Portugal will probably be punished for its pro-British attitude.

D. Conclusion: No doubt seems to exist in the minds of German geopoliticians that 1) German control of North and West Africa is an essential part of the strategy of the war and that 2) Africa is to be organized as a supplement to European, and especially German, economy.

SECRET

GERMAN "EURAFRICAN" OBJECTIVES AS DEVELOPED IN GEOPOLITICAL THEORY

A. Importance of Geopolitics[1]

The importance of the group of writers associated with the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik has not been definitely determined--in spite of all that has been written in this country concerning it. Certainly the function of these writers is to prepare propaganda for German military and economic imperialism. This propaganda is aimed at middle-class and upper-class readers in Germany, and at influential people in foreign countries whose support for German plans is desired. We do not know if Haushofer is an important adviser to the German General Staff. In case he is, his advice is not necessarily reflected in his published writings, but probably transmitted in other ways. On the other hand, however, it may be that the writings of his group are symptomatic of the General German plans, for it has been possible to show that a number of statements in the Zeitschrift prophesied correctly subsequent military and political action. Still it should be noted that such prophecies could have been made by American students of German affairs. Nevertheless, the concepts of Geopolitik appear to be taken seriously in high quarters in Germany. As Niedermayer puts it, the German nation no longer plans its defense in terms of military geography alone, but studies "Wehrgeographie," and even more important, "Wehrgeopolitik."[2] What writers on Geopolitik have to say about Africa and the Mediterranean, therefore, cannot be dismissed lightly.

---

[1] There can be no sharp delineation of "the writers associated with the German Geopolitik school." For the purposes of this report, because of the limited staff and the short time allowed, it was narrowly restricted for the most part to the writers associated with the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. It is possible that significant studies might also be found in the standard geographical journals. Much more important, in all probability, are the Vierjahresplan Raumforschung und Raumordnung, and the economic journals.

B. German Plans for Africa

Nearly all German geopolitical statements on Africa and the Mediterranean indicate that the Nazis, upon achievement of victory in this war, intend to take over political control of the greater part of, if not the whole African continent. The first point of evidence is the prominence which Geopolitik writers have given to discussion of colonial problems. As far back as 1927 and 1928 articles on colonies were appearing in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*.[3] At first mild, and sympathetic with the "oppressed" natives,[4] they rapidly become more and more belligerent, insisting upon Germany's rights, and critical of English and French "dog-in-the-manger" attitude. This reached its peak in 1939 in the *Zeitschrift für Politik*, when two entire numbers[5] were devoted to the colonial "question." In the course of this campaign there appeared such statements as: "Germany demands the unequivocal return of her former protectorates."[6] "The German Lebensraum is too small without being supplemented by colonies."[7] "An answer to the burning German question of colonial activity is given when one contemplates an economic map of Africa." "When the time comes, we shall not forget that the map of Africa has been altered since 1880." "(Germany should) develop Africa as a source of raw materials, to make Europe completely independent of the good will of America and Asia."[8]

---

[2] Niedermayer, Oskar von, "Wehrgeographie", Wissen und Wehr, 1934, 305ff.

---

[3] Friedmann, R., "Frankreich und der Islam," *Z.f.G.* IV, 1927, pp. 58-63; Ross, Colin, "Afrika in seiner Weltpolitischer Entwicklung", *Z.f.G.* IV 1928, pp. 1-4; Von Bülow, J., "Der Antikolonialkongress in Brussel", *Z.f.G.* IV, 1927, pp. 373-81.

[4] Von Bulow, J., "Der Antikolonialkongress in Brussel," *Z.f.G.* IV, 1927, pp. 373-81.

[5] *Zeitschrift für Politik*: "Spezialheft über die Kolonialfrage", v. 29, Jan.-Feb. 1939, heft 1/2 pp. 1-155. With articles by E. Obst, H..Schnee, R. von Epp, K. Sapper, Dr. Zeitschell, P. Muhlens, D. Westermann, H. Stellrecht, S. von Wagenheim, K. Johannsen, F. C. Willis, F. Stock, M. Hagen, M. E. Pasemann, J. Loeber.

[6] Obst, Erich, "Lebensräume der Weltvölker," *Z.f.G.*, v. 29, 1939, p. 9

[7] Von Epp, R., "Die Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Kolonien", *Z.f.G.* v. 29, 1939, p. 30

That colonial aspirations have not been given up in the eastward military expansion of Germany, and that preparation for the administration of colonies even now is being undertaken, is shown in the recent literature[9], which informs us that Germany intends to "construct a supplementary colonial economy"[10] and". . . the paternal system of German colonial policy was in right direction" (while English and French policies are not)[11].

Perhaps even more significant is the recent tendency of editorial comment in the *Zeitschrift für*

---

[8] Oertzen, A. V., "Afrikanische Kolonisations probleme", *Z.f.G.* IV, 1928, pp.62, 71

[9] Camerota, P. d'A O. di, "Das faschistische Siedlungsysteme in Afrika." *Z.f.G.* XVIII, 1941, pp. 362-71; Dietzel, K. H., "Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik", *Z.f.G.* XVII, 1941, pp. 313-22; Dietzel, K. H., "Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik, II", *Z.f.G.* XVII, 1940, pp. 372-76; Hunke, Heinrich, "Volk und Raum in der Wirtschaftpolitischen Neuordnung Europas", *Z.f.G.* XVII, 1940, pp. 571-75.

[10] Hunke, Heinrich, "Volk und Raum in der Wirtchaftpolitischen Neuordnung Europas", *Z.f.G.* XVII, 1940, pp. 572

[11] Dietzel, K. H., "Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik, II", *Z.f.G.* XVII, 1940, p. 376

Geopolitik to refer to "Eurafrika, the new Lebensraum."[12] An Italian contributor to the August 1941 issue of the same Zeitschrift discusses at length this concept of Eurafrica - "Africa for Europe and Europe for Africa."[13] It is noted in this connection that Africa, and particularly tropical Africa, can be valuable as an economic complement of Europe. If developed, its production can make good Europe's shortages of several raw materials--vegetable oils, cocoa, cotton, tropical fruits. Heretofore, it is complained, the exploitation of these resources has served imperial, that is especially British, purposes, rather than the needs of all Europe. Tropical Africa, we are reminded, is a natural economic entity, and the several political and economic systems that have parcelled it out, have served only to hamper the development of its potentialities, much as the multiplicity of states (Kleinstaaterei) in pre-Bismarchian days, hindered the full development of German energies. One of the prerequisites for the exploitation of this tropical area is its unification, both political and economic[14] (presumably under German auspices). As an economic sphere for Europe, Africa will attain importance "in the near future", we are assured by Barth.[15] No more will "Europe stew in its own juice, shut off from all sources of raw material."[16]

---

[12] Anonymous, "Diesem Heft zum Geleit", Z.f.G., XVII, 1940, pp. 569, 596, 597, 598

[13] Orsini, Poolo D'A., "Die Kolonialfrage und die Neue Ordnung" Z.f.G. XVIII, 1941, pp. 432-40.

C. German Regional Plans for Africa

References by Geopolitik writers to specific parts of Africa are equally alarming.

1) North and West Africa

a) The Short-run View

Geopolitik statements almost always refer to long term objectives, but a notable exception to this appears for North and West Africa. In a noteworthy analytical article published last year Hermann Rockel[17] indicates many good reasons why Germany will take over control of French North and West

---

[14] Der Vierjahresplan, Zeitschrift für nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik, Sonderausgabe, January, 1941, p. 73

[15] Barth, Heinz, "Spanien ist eingeschaltet", Das Reich, Sept. 29, 1940, p. 4

[16] Anonymous, "Streiflichter auf den Atlantischen Raum", Z.f.G. XVIII, 1941, p. 285

[17] Rockel Hermann, "Dakar das Zentrum der Seestrategischen Stellung Frankreichs an Mittleren Atlantik," Z.f.G., XVII, 1940, pp. 419-26

Africa as soon as it is able. Rockel very logically points out that since the Mediterranean is now unsafe for shipping, the Cape route is second only to the north Atlantic in its importance to Britain. And Dakar ("an Atlantic Gibraltar--a good U-boat base"), seconded by Casablanca, controls the Cape route. Germany will go a long way toward defeating Britain if it severs the Cape route. ("(If Germany stops traffic) on this second route Britain's fate is sealed.") The intimation therefrom is that Germany will not hesitate to take over the Atlantic part of West Africa as soon as she is ready. Declarations by other responsible men support this suggestion. For instance Admiral Raeder said, over a decade ago: "If ever the Vigo-Canaries-Azores triangle should be constituted and placed under a single military authority, the automatic consequence would be a complete reversal in the European situation and the relations between European countries and all the other continents. . .a reversal in favor of the Power which occupied the points strongly centralized government in Madrid. Consequently Catalonian demands for autonomy (autonomous Catalonia would be a satellite of France); and the destruction of Spanish democracy were essential. Spain, in German opinion, must be strong enough to develop her proper interest in the Mediterranean, and thereby challenge the French imperial position.[36] This policy produced results so gratifying that a German military writer stated in 1939 that Germany could win a war in the Mediterranean with the help of her allies.

Since France in the foreseeable future is not likely to be a serious rival of a finally victorious Germany, we may assume that this motive no longer determines German policy toward Spain. Nevertheless, Germany still treats Spain with consideration. The Zeitschrift für Geopolitik is definitely friendly toward Spain, and its independence and territorial integrity are taken for granted.[37] The reason appears to be that Berlin sees Spain as useful to it in the future, and at the same time appreciates the proud and independent nature of the Spanish people.[38] Germany has not yet given up using Spain as a cultural decoy for Latin America, as the latest editorial comments prove.[39] In recent copies of the *Zeitschrift* Spain has often been referred to as the motherland of Latin America. To fit Spain for her new role, German writers like Barth seek the development of a new attitude among inhabitants of the peninsula. The Spaniard, complains Barth, has lived too long with his back to his seacoasts; he has been too much of a Castilian. The time has come for him to turn outward to the oceans--toward the Atlantic as well as toward the Mediterranean.[40]

---

[36] Metzel, Konrad, "Militärische Mittelmeerfragen", Militär Wochenblatt, 124, 1939, pp. 90-91

[37] Haushofer, K., "Spanische Geopolitik" (Review), Z.f.G., XVII, 1940, pp. 395-6

With this in mind Germany pays lip service to, and may even support the Spanish demand for the repatriation of Gibraltar.[41] Comments in the Zeitschrift tend to belittle Gibraltar's present importance to present-day warfare, while emphasizing Spanish rule over it as a point of honor. "Gibraltar in foreign hands is a thorn in the heart of Spain, and will always remain so."[42] Furthermore, the Mediterranean is dangled in front of Spain (as well as Italy) as part of its natural lebensraum.[43]

---

[38] Banse, Ewald, *Germany Prepares for War*, New York, 1934, p. 357.

[39] Vives, Jaime Vicens, "Spanien und die Geopolitische Neuordnung der Welt", *Z.f.G.*, XVIII, 1941, pp. 256-63

[40] Barth, Heinz, "Spanien ist eingeschaltet", *Das Reich*, Sept. 29, 1940, p. 4; *Idem*, "Spaniens historische Mission," *Volk und Reich*, 1941, No. 2, pp. 77-93

Against these statements we have to balance some German commentaries on the importance of Gibraltar, and frequent mention of the importance of Spain as a land bridge to Africa, the connecting link between two parts of the future "Eurafrika"[44]. "Gibraltar is before all part of the great commercial route to India." And "Gibraltar is certainly, and will continue in the future to be the most important key to the Mediterranean".[45] With ambitious German plans for Africa it is likely that the Nazis will want to control the Mediterranean sea route as well as the land route. Spain probably will be able to measure its importance in the Mediterranean only in terms of the accuracy with which it toes the German line.

---

[41] Hummel, H. and Siewert, Wulf, Der Mittelmeerraum zur Geopolitik eines Maritimem Grossraums, Heidelberg, 1936.

[42] Hermann, G., Gibraltar-die Pforte des Mittelmeers, Leipsig, 1938, p. 72

[43] Volk und Reich, 1941, no. 2, p. 84.

[44] Idem, pp. 77, 87.

Portugal receives only one reference, but that is sufficient to indicate German attitude toward it. Rockel[46] notes that it has been a nation friendly to England, and that it has an important strategic position on the Atlantic routes. That was deemed sufficient warning for Portugal.

---

[45] Hermann, G., *Gibraltar--die Pforte des Mittelmeers*, Leipzig, 1938, p. 78. (These views are seconded by information from recent Chilean diplomatic reports--namely, that Germany intends to take Gibraltar this winter as a prelude to a North African campaign. (Central Information Division, Coordinator of Information, Accession #2288.))

[46] Rockel, Hermann, "Dakar das Zentrum der Seestrategischen Stellung Frankreichs am Mittleren Atlantik," *Z.f.G.*, XVII, 1940, pp. 419-26.

SECRET

THE PROBLEM OF VICHY

FORCES AFFECTING THE DISPOSITION OF PÉTAIN, DARLAN AND THE NAVY, WEYGAND AND THE AFRICAN ARMY, NOGUÈS, AND BOISSON

Western European Section

SECRET

THE PROBLEM OF VICHY

Summary and Conclusion

A. Metropolitan France

In the confused and confusing situation at Vichy, the disposition of 1. Pétain, 2. Darlan, and 3. certain persons under them is the principal French factor; but this must be considered in the context of the superior physical force of the Germans. Though the Germans, in accordance with their customs, have so far seen fit to employ "peaceful" means in prosecuting their aims in France, their hand may be forced, and the tempo and ruthlessness of their actions increased, by some sudden development.

1. Pétain maintains a strong hold on the French people, and he possesses a few bargaining points; but his policy of gradual concession, conditioned in some measure by a desire to remain on good terms with the United States, may be brought to a sudden end by death or some other cause.

2. Darlan, being an opportunist, is a very uncertain quantity. Much depends on whether or not the reports are true that he has changed his mind concerning the outcome of the war.

3. In case of sudden change in the situation, the typical collaborationists have good chances of surviving.

Conclusion: The Germans, in the short run, will almost certainly get their way, whether by pressure or by force of arms.

3. Vichy and Africa

In Africa, 1. Weygand, 2. Noguès, and 3. Boisson are, though by no means pro-British, strongly anti-German; but, with their weak forces, they are unlikely--with the possible exception of Boisson--to undertake armed resistance.

Conclusion: Here again, the Germans will probably gain their ends by gradual pressure, unless their hand is forced, in which case they will probably engage in a short and decisive armed operation.

THE PROBLEM OF VICHY

The present situation in French Northwest Africa--and the same is true of French West Africa--is closely interconnected with the situation in "Metropolitan" France. The African regions are, in other and more important senses than the juridical, dependent on the present capital of the French Empire, Vichy.

A. Metropolitan France

With respect to the problem of Vichy, the primary consideration is that of the principal figures involved,--namely, the Head of the French State, Marshal Pétain, his "heir apparent", Admiral Darlan, and certain persons under them.

1. Pétain.

(a) Public Regard

The most salient consideration concerning Pétain is the strong hold he has upon the French people. Though reports persist that his prestige has become less,[1] distinction ought undoubtedly to be made between Pétain as a person and certain aspects of his acts and policies. Pétain is without doubt still held in high esteem by his fellow countrymen.

---

[1] N. Y. Office, N.I.D., Current Events #151, Rept. No. 1848, Oct. 22, 1941.

Pétain, according to a plausible and an apparently trustworthy report[2], is said to have complained that he is out of touch with public opinion. This complaint doubtless has as its basis an inevitable feeling of loneliness and a consciousness of efforts on the part of some of those surrounding him to build up further his isolation. On the other hand, Pétain probably possesses sound instinct concerning present public feeling. Evidence of his confidence in this respect is to be seen in his appeal to the French people, contrary to strong French traditional sentient, to accept unquestioningly his words and decisions[3]. He is said to have been deeply hurt and moved to a bitter outburst when Darlan supported one of his proposals through reference to loss of prestige on the part of the Marshal[4]. In any event, Pétain has undoubtedly strengthened his personal position, as well as had occasion to appraise public opinion, by means of ceremonial trips through various parts of the unoccupied zone. The advantages of this procedure were presumably understood by Wegand when he attempted to arrange a visit by Pétain to North Africa[5]. Though it has been said that Darlan approved this trip[6] and though it has been insisted that no significance attaches to failure of this effort of Weygand's[7], it seems likely that some of those surrounding Pétain would do what they could to oppose such a move[8]. Finally, evidence of the regard in which Petain is held personally is to be seen in the unpopularity of attacks on Pétain by General de Gaulle[9]. In France, even persons who are sympathetic with the Free French movement have undoubtedly viewed these attacks with strong disfavour; and friends everywhere of a free France recognize that the action was mistaken[10].

---

[2] Brit. Inf. Services, Letter to Col. Donovan concerning one Reopell.

[3] V. *infra*.

[4] F.B.I., Confident. Memo., Sept. 30, 1941.

---

[5] Algiers, Secret. Tel., #479, Oct. 1, 1941.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1286, Oct. 10, 1941.

[8] Algiers, Secret Tel., #492, Oct. 8, 1941.

[9] V., e.g., Naval At., Madrid, Restricted Intel. Rept., March 8, 1941.

The regard of the French people for Petain has been expressed in figures of speech such as that of a drowning man clutching at any support. The hero of Verdun is said to be all that the French have. Certain asspects of his record and of his reputation as a reactionary are not unnaturally forgotten or overlooked, while emphasis is placed on assertions that Pétain is a sincere and honorable man. Like many military figures, he is commonly regarded as a monarchist[11]. For years before the war, he was known as an advocate of an authoritarian regime as a solution for France's political, social, and economic problems. He was, at the time, almost certainly not sorry to see the end of the Third Republic in France.

---

[10] V. infra.

[11] Cf. Geneva, Secret Tel., #101, Oct. 31, 1941.

If, as is undoubtedly true, some persons who were of considerable influence in the country before the defeat of France and who now support collaboration, carried their fascist sympathies so far as literally to prefer defeat by Hitler to continuance of political democracy in France,--nevertheless, no greater mistake can be made than one frequently made in England and this country, to assume that all Frenchmen with authoritarian sympathies and anti-parliamentary views are pro-German. However that may be, Pétain is strongly nationalistic and undoubtedly patriotic. As such, he is, whatever may be his ideological biases, fundamentally anti-German. His connection with collaboration ought to be viewed with that fact as background.

(b) Collaboration

Pétain is commonly said to have accepted the principle of collaboration in a speech which he broadcast to the French people on October 31, 1940. This speech followed by one week the well-known meeting between Pétain and Hitler at Montoire, at which a military welcome was accorded to to Petain. In the course of his speech as recorded in the press, Pétain said:

> "Collaboration between our two countries was considered. I accepted the principle of it. The application will be discussed later...He who has taken charge of the destiny of France has the duty of creating the most favourable atmosphere to safeguard the interest of the country. It is with honour, and to maintain French unity, a unity of ten centuries, within the framework of a constructive activity of the new European order, that I enter today the path of collaboration. In the near future, the load of suffering of our country may thus be lightened, the lot of our prisoners improved, the burden of occupation expenses lessened, and so the line of demarcation may be rendered more flexible and the administration and provisioning of the territory facilitated."

In so far as lose of prestige results from unpopularity of measures, Pétain has recognized that he does not possess the full support of the French people. The attitude of the people in this respect is frequently said to be influenced primarily by the Vichy record on Indo-China[12]; but this, though involving Japan rather than Germany, is probably best viewed at part of the somewhat vague and largely unexamined concept of "colaboration". Since opposition to collaboration and opposition to Germany tend to be identified by the French, the overwhelming evidence of an anti-German and an anti-collaborationist attitude on the part of the people is cumilative in its force. It was certainly consciousness of this attitude which caused Pétain, on May 26, 1941, to make his extraordinary appeal[13]:

---

[12] Cf. N. Y. Office, M.I.D., loc. cit.

> "For you, the French people, it is simply a question of following me without mental reservations along the path of honour and national interest."

Pétain's position is inevitably conditioned by the basic consideration that France is in so many senses at the mercy of Germany. The unhappy position of France needs no description. It can be appreciated with a little imagination. Pétain has phrased the matter in his well-known reference to being a man with a rope round his neck. If the few bargaining points which France possesses are, in this figure, reflected in the fact that the breath of life still remains, it is nonetheless true that the rope can at will be pulled tight.

---

[13] Cf supra.

In these conditions, Pétain attempts to follow a nicely balanced and consequently difficult course which perhaps ought not to be regarded as mere opportunism. He himself apparently does not regard it as full collaboration. He is reported to have said that his actions are criticized by the collaborationists as well as by the Allies, and that, this being the case, he can swim neither to the one side or the other, but can only "float"[14]. Unless this situation is viewed charitably, the impression is gained of a good deal of wavering. Leahy has suggested that Petain is "always inclined to yield to the greatest immediate pressure"[15]. Not only could more firmness be imagined in respect of Indo-China,[16] Iraq, Syria, and Russia; examples can likewise be found in internal matters. Thus, for example, Pétain is said to be aware of the growing influence of the Banque Worms group but not to oppose it, on the ground that it may possibly serve some useful purpose[17]. He is likewise said to have stubbornly opposed the establishment of the Legion as a single party, only to give in at the end[18]. A similar attitude seems to be involved in the appointment of Colonel de la Rosque to a relatively unimportant position[19]. Other examples, according to report, include the passage of foodstuffs through Tunisia to Libya[20] and the surrender of Allied vessels to the Axis[21].

---

[14] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., #147, Aug. 31, 1941

[15] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1225: Sept. 5, 1941

[16] Cf. *supra*.

A charitable view of Pétain's position would see in it maximum firmness on essentials, with reluctant concessions on details. It may be, as had been suggested on allegedly strong grounds, that Pétain is playing a splendid game[22]. In this, manifestly only time will tell.

---

[17] Vichy, Strict. Confident., Air mail, Sept. 2, 1941.

[18] F.B.I., Confident. Memo., Sept. 30, 1941.

[19] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1257, Oct. 3, 1941.

[20] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1225, Sept. 25, 1941.

[21] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1241, Sept. 29, 1941.

(c) Africa

Though Pétain can scarcely be said to have remained within the terms of the Armistice as reasonably interpreted[23], he in general attempts to adopt these terms as limits for his activities. More particularly, he has been vigorous in his opposition to collaboration in respect of Africa. According to Leahy, Rist, after dining with Pétain and Weygand on October 19, stated that he found them both determinted to yield no concessions to the Germans in North Africa[24].

(d) American Support

Pétain seems undoubtedly to desire to remain on good terms with the United States. He is reported to think that America has already won the war.[25] Though he is said also to believe that the United States has designs on Africa, he has, according to the same report, ordered Darlan to be especially considerate towards Admiral Leahy[26].

---

[22] F.B.I., Intercepts, June 18, 1941.

[23] Cf. Vichy, Secret Tel., #1241, Sept. 29, 1941.

[24] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1350, Oct. 20, 1941.

[25] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., #147, Aug. 31, 1941.

Leahy has alluded to Pétain's "continuing firmness". He thinks this is to be attributed to our determination to defeat Germany, to our impressive defense programs, and to Russian resistance[28]. He reports that as a result of Pétain's firmness, the Germans have interrupted negotiations on collaboration[29]. According to a report of a conference between Pétain and Boisson, Pétain said that President Roosevelt had expressed the hope in a personal letter to him that he would not permit the Germans to occupy French possessions in North Africa, and that he had given the President the desired assurance[30]. Weygand is reported to have said that no one at Vichy dares to object to the Franco-American economic agreement[31].

---

[26] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., #147, Aug. 31, 1941.

[27] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1225, Sept. 25, 1941.

[28] *Ibid*.

[29] *Ibid*.

Pétain's attitude towards America is well illustrated by the Rist affair. Leahy reported on the matter on September 26. He stated that Pétain, Darlan, and others recognized that, in spite of German disapproval, Henri-Haye would have ultimately to be removed, if Franco-American relations were to be improved[32]. A Rist mission to the United States, with a personal greeting from Petain, would pave the way. The idea was that Rist could be told categorically in Washington what our position is in the matter of North Africa, sothat Vichy could get from a source in which it has confidence, an account which would support what Leahy has been reporting and would offset the misleading views transmitted by Henri-Haye[33].

---

[30] Dakar, Secret Tel., #364, Oct. 29, 1941.

[31] Algiers, Secret Tel., #525, Oct. 23, 1941.

[32] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1229, Sept. 26, 1941.

2. Darlan

(a) Opportunism

Darlan's most salient characteristic is asserted on all sides to be his opportunism. This is closely related with his alleged consuming ambition. In any event, his present high position was reached not through active service but through peacetime activity in the French bureaucracy[34]. He is commonly thought to be anti-British and pro-German. If, in the event of an Allied victory, he can successfully become pro-British and anti-German, he will have strong claim to being the supreme opportunist of all time.

(b) Change of Position

Somewhat persistent reports suggest that Darlan has changed his mind about the outcome of the war. Thus, Commander Hillenkoetter testifies to such a likelihood[35]. Several other statements support the view that Darlan has become convinced that Germany will not win. For example, on October 3, Admiral Fenard, as well as another member of Weygand's staff, is quoted by Murphy as saying that a profound change had taken place in Darlan's views concerning France's foreign policy and the eventual outcome of the war[36]. He is said to recognize that he had put his money on the wrong horse and to be greatly embarrassed as to how to change horses[37].

---

[33] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1231, Sept. 27, 1941.

[34] Cf. N. Y. Herald Trib., Oct. 7, 1941.

A day later, Murphy quotes Weygand as saying that Darlan had undergone a change of mind, with the result that whereas in June Weygand had to oppose Darlan's collaborationist tendencies in North Africa, he now has his support[38]. A report of

---

[35] O.N.I., F-3, Confident., #152, Oct. 7, 1941.

[36] Algiers, Secret Tel., #481, Oct. 3, 1941.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

October 20 of this year from Algiers states that the French Admiralty is beginning to cooperate with Weygand.[39]

If Darlan has changed his mind, reports concerning him become the more difficult properly to interpret. In cases where his skill as an opportunist is sufficient to deceive the reporter, he will still be regarded as the arch-collaborationist. As a result, such reports will neither confirm nor deny one view or the other concerning his conversion. The report that Darlan recognizes the importance of the good will of this country[40] would seem on the whole to be more consistent with change on Darlan's part. This is still more the case with reports of German opposition to Darlan, especially in view of earlier reports that Darlan was viewed as at least equally acceptable to the Germans as Laval. A British report of August 6 refers to Darlan's loss of strength and states that German pressure is being brought against him with a view to his removal[41]. An American report asserts that a request by Darlan for Vichy control of the Paris press was bluntly refused by the Germans.[42] A report of opposition by Pucheu to Darlan[43] ought possibly to be interpreted in the same way. Finally, it is said that Darlan, on his last trip to Paris, had no relations with the Germans[44]. Negotiations with them, it is said, are carried on almost exclusively by Benoist-Mechin[45].

---

[39] Algiers, Secret Tel., #517, Oct. 20, 1941.

[40] Vichy, Secret Tel., # 1231, Sept. 27, 1941.

(c) The French Navy

British reports suggest that they have no doubt but that the French Navy will cooperate with the Germans[46]. This is apparently deduced from the propositions that the Navy sees eye to eye with Darlan, and that Darlan is irrevocably anti-British and pro-German. It seems probable that the conditions of life and the treatment of French sailors have in fact improved to the point that the situation of the sailors compares favourably with that of the army. No rationing appears to prevail in the navy, and arrears of pay have apparently been met[47]. At the same time, the best view would seem to be that the Navy is highly unlikely to collaborate with the Germans[48]. The majority of the sailors and many officers, especially those of lower ranks, appear to be definitely hostile to collaboration[49]. Opinion is almost unanimous that greatest French resistance to Germany and greatest sympathy for England are to be found in the coastal regions, which are precisely the regions from which the Navy is principally recruited.

---

[41] N.I.D., 0064, Situation Rept., No. 6, Aug. 6, 1941.

[42] F.B.I., Intercepts, June 23, 1941.

[43] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1242, Sept. 30, 1941.

[44] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1355, Oct. 20, 1941.

[45] Algiers, Secret Tel., #481, Oct. 3, 1941.

[46] N.I.D., 0100, Aug. 26, 1941.

---

[47] N.I.D., 0064, Situation Rept., No. 6, Aug. 6, 1941.

[48] Cf. O.N.I., F-3, Confident., #152, Oct. 7, 1941.

[49] Cf. ibid.

3. Other Figures in Vichy

A French scientist[50] has recently written that "there are no 'Men of Vichy'". There are, he says, "only men in Vichy, each trying to give France the kind of orientation that is passionately desired for France by the faction or by the caste which sent them to power". There is certainly considerable justice in this remark. Generalization is correspondingly difficult.

(a) Civil Service

In general, the body of functionaries in France consists of former civil servants "purged" of the most notorious supporters of the Left. To these should be added a certain number of retired army officers and a smaller number of naval officers. Pétain and Darlan have naturally surrounded themselves respectively with such officers; but it would be a mistake to conclude that any far-reaching antagonism exists between the two staffs.

So far as the French administrative system is concerned, two somewhat opposed tendencies seem to have been manifesting themselves. From force of circumstances, the Prefects have been obliged to take an abnormally large number of decisions on their own responsibility, thus realizing in practice a large degree of that "deconcentration" which the textbooks have so long discussed. In this way, the Departments have tended to become highly autonomous; and the effects of the "purge" have tended to become stultified in cases where the Prefects consult the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants. On the other hand, this tendency has been offset in the Occupied Zone by strong German control and, in the Free Zone, by the establishment of regional Prefects. If, in the latter case, the centralizing intentions of the reform are fully realized, the Germans will have reason to be grateful, in the event that they take over the whole of France.

---

[50] Cf. N. Y. Herald Trib., loc. cit.

(b) Collaborators Par Excellence

It is reported that the men who make it most difficult for Pétain to pursue a course of firmness are Benoist-Mechin, Pucheu, Lehideux, and Marion[51].

Benoist-Mechin, as has been said, is reported to have been conducting Vichy negotiations with the Germans. This undoubtedly gives him a certain kind of strength. Insistence that an anti-American speech by him reflected only his own views, not that of the Government[52], is probably accurate.

Various reports suggest that Pucheu may be a man to watch. He is associated with the Banque Worms group, whose influence is said to be growing[53]. Publication of Pétain's Labour Charter, which smacks no little of fascism, was delayed, Leahy reports, by opposition from Pucheu, who wished to enhance even more the advantages to the capitalist class[54]. Pucheu's basic strength, however, comes from his connection with the police. A recent report asserts that under his orders the number of police in Paris was increased from 23,000 to about 45,000, with indiscriminate arrest as the trend.[55]

---

[51] Algiers, Secret Tel., #481, Oct. 3, 1941.

[52] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1239, Sept. 29, 1941.

[53] Vichy, Strictly Confident., Air Mail, Sept. 2, 1941.

[54] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1393, Oct. 29, 1941.

CONCLUSION: The situation in Vichy is clearly a highly confused and confusing one. At the same time, British reports[56] of discord and dissension are, though supported to some extent by testimony from Weygand[57], probably exaggerated. On the whole, the Germans are likely in the short run to get their way. What that way will be would seem to depend on many uncertain circumstances. The Germans frequently move, expecially when they are occupied elsewhere as in Russia at present, slowly and persistently in the effort to gain their ends by "peaceful" means; but where some event, perhaps unforeseeable, forces their hand, they strike swiftly and ruthlessly.

---

[55] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1285, Oct. 9, 1941.

[56] Cf., e.G., N.I.D., 0977, Situation Rept., No. 3, June 21, 1941.

[57] Cf. Algiers, Secret Tel., #523, Oct. 22, 1941.

Pétain's position has considerable strength. He may be able to continue his policy of gradual concession; but he is an old man, and death or some other cause may remove him suddenly from the scene. Darlan's opportunism makes him a very uncertain quantity. If he has really undergone a change of heart, the Germans are not likely to remain unaware of it, in which case his days are almost certainly numbered. Thorough going collaborationists seem to have the best chance of survival if a crisis develops quickly. Otherwise, the present Government may weather the storm for a time longer. The result, in the absence of fundamental change in the military situation, will be basically the same whether the tempo is slower or quicker, whether the end be called collaboration or some other name.

B. Vichy and Africa

The situation in French Africa and its interrelationship with the situation in Vichy are conditioned in a fundamental way by the chief figures in Africa. The principal person is of course Weygand. Of lesser importance are Nogues and Boisson.

1. Weygand

(a) General Attitude

Weygand is what the French call a "cas à part". He has said of himself that he and his army constitute the last trump that France possesses[58].

One statement of Weygand's general attitude describes him as equally opposed to two extremes,--namely, close collaboration with the Germans and support of de Gaulle and the British. He is also regarded as being very anti-Soviet. His hostility to the Germans, to which may be added an anti-Italian sentiment, emanates from his present feelings as a French patriot. These hostile feelings appear to outweigh the strength of his feeling against de Gaulle, the British, and Russia. Weygand is, for whatever reason, apparently pro-American.

Since the Armistice, Weygand has in his public utterances made some exceedingly bitter remarks about the British. Since these are of record, little relevance attaches to the query whether Weygand may be consciously or unconsciously influenced by his mistaken guess, at the time of the collapse of France, concerning British power of resistance. The Free French apparently conceive that Weygand's position is to be defined largely in terms of his attitude towards the British. The Free French Intelligence Service claims that they have information direct from Weygand establishing his strong anti-British feeling and his determination to prevent at all costs the British from getting a foothold in North Africa. They assert that he refuses to entertain the possibility that the British may be victorious. He believes, they say, that the British will not be beaten, but will become so exhausted as no longer to be able to continue the war. Weygand, according to the Free French account, thinks that at this point Britain will merely "disinterest herself in European affairs"[59]. The French journalist, Pierre Lyautey, whose reports should probably be accepted with some caution, stated in September that Weygand expected in the near future a British attack[60]. On the whole, such an attack seems somewhat less likely than that Weygand will join the British. In any event, Pierre Lyautey states that if the British were in Tripoli in great force and should menace by sea Bizerta or Casablanca, Weygand, with proper handling, might go over to the British, declaring his independence of Vichy[61].

---

[58] O.N.I., F-2, Confident., #152, Oct. 7, 1941.

---

[59] Naval At., London, Confident., Aug. 19, 1941.

One relatively reliable source suggests that all officers in North Africa are potential de Gaulle men, by whom it is generally assumed that should the British and Free French get a foothold in North Africa, Weygand would take over command[62]. Because of this, Weygand is said to have got some hundred de Gaulle adherents into his own camp by having them released from prison and preaching patience to them, making them understand, though he does not commit himself, that the right hour will strike at a future date[63].

---

[60] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., Sept. 2, 1941. (#5149)

[61] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., Aug. 31, 1941.

[62] Naval At., Madrid, Intel. Rept., May 8, 1941, of conference with Joseph D. Ravotto, U. P. Correspondent, just back from visit to North Africa.

There appears to be no doubt but that Weygand distinguishes, as suggested by a highly competent American military observer, between de Gaulle and the Free French movement. However, Weygand's hostility does not extend to all Free French leaders. Though he would, as the above-mentioned observer further suggests, possibly shoot de Gaulle as a traitor, he is nevertheless in communication with General Catroux, towards whom Weygand has kindly feelings[64]. In January of this year, General Catroux, in writing to General de Gaulle and to the British Foreign Secretary, asserted that he was convinced Weygand would take no action that would injure the Allied cause and that, more especially, he would be glad to see the Free French fight against Italy[65].

---

[63] Ibid.

[64] Cairo, #2346, Feb. 14, 1941. Also, materials in files of Free French in Washington.

[65] Letters in files of Free French in Washington.

There is a report from a different source to the effect that a certain Comte de Rose is at the same time an undercover representatime of de Gaulle and in the confidence of French officilas in Morocco[66]. According to Leahy, Weygand has been pressed by the Germans, so far of course without success, to attempt to reconquer the French African colonies held by the Free French[67]. Commander Hillenkoetter reports that Weygand has asserted his determination never to consent to such an undertaking[68]. Murphy reports an assertion by Weygand to the same effect.[69] In general, Weygand has consistently lamented fratricidal war of any kind on the part of the French. More particularly, he is said to have been very bitter about the Syrian campaign. However, Murphy, on seeing Weygand about October 1 of this year, found him in a confident mood, with his bitterness over Syria gone[70]. Nevertheless, propaganda efforts in respect of North Africa which attempt to create pro-de Gaulle sentiment would seem to tread on dangerous ground[71]; and Weygand has had occasion to enter a mild protest in this regard[72].

---

[66] Private interview

[67] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1225, Sept. 25, 1941.

[68] O.N.I., F-3, Confident., #152, Oct. 7, 1941.

[69] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

Weygand, in spite of his anti-Soviet bias, was recently represented as pleased with the situation in Russia. This probably has reference to the diversion of German strength rather than to any belief in ultimate Russian military victory. Another report from the same source states the matter by saying that Weygand believes Moscow will hold out for a long time[73].

Eloquent testimony to Weygand's resistance to the Germans[74] is to be found in German hostility to Weygand. A British report states that Germany has made serious complaints against Weygand[75]; and an American report suggests that the Nazis are anxious to see Weygand replaced by Dentz[76]. For his part, Weygand is, according to another report[77], disgusted by the Nazi brutality displayed in the matter of reprisals. So far as the Italians are concerned, Weygand is reported recently to have given them categorical warnings not to land planes in Tunisia[78].

---

[70] Ibid.

[71] Secret Propaganda Plan for French North Africa (Appendix A to French Plan).

[72] Algiers, Secret Tel., #555, Oct. 31, 1941.

[73] Algiers, Secret Tel., #525, Oct. 23, 1941.

[74] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1231, Sept. 27, 1941.

Weygand's pro-American attitude appears to be somewhat complex. Suggestions have been made that Weygand and his staff were at one time hopeful of American military intervention in Africa, though they are said subsequently to have become somewhat discouraged in this hope, and similar suggestions have been made recently that Weygand would welcome American armed assistance.

---

[75] N.I.D., 0064 Situation Rept., No. 6, Aug. 6, 1941.

[76] Geneva, Secret Tel., #101, Oct. 31, 1941.

[77] Algiers, loc. cit.

[78] Ibid.

He is also said at one time to have believed that America, on the assumption of a negotiated peace following British exhaustion[79], would exercise great influence on the final terms and that this constitutes a good reason for standing in with the United States. If this represents his view, he will doubtless find that America's support to France will be forthcoming only on condition that France herself displays some stiffness of attitude[80]. At all events, Weygand naturally approves fully of the economic agreement. In spite of some hint of violation of its terms[81], Weygand's desire to remain on good terms with the United States will certainly stiffen his resistance. For example, when, according to Murphy, Weygand recently refused to permit delivery of from 3000 to 5000 tons of cobalt ore to a Japanese company, the motive suggested was that of fear of adversely affecting American opinion[82]; and Weygand has used his influence with Vichy to gain consent for proposals emanating from this country[83]. Finally, Weygand is reported thoroughly to approve the plan to sent Rist to Washington[84].

---

[79] Cf. supra.

[80] Cf. Secret Tel. to Vichy, #817, Nov. 3, 1941.

[81] Cf. Secret Tel., to Murphy, #280, Oct. 21, 1941.

(b) Collaboration

There is considerable evidence strongly testifying to the fact that Weygand is opposed to collaboration. No suggestion has appeared that he has collaborated or that he would collaborate.

Rist included Weygand with Pétain in his judgment that no concessions would be granted to the Germans in Africa[85]. As a matter of fact, Weygand is probably more vigorous than Petain in his opposition. Indeed, a Vichy official asserted, shortly before the Rist dinner, that only the voice of Weygand is raised against the collaborationis trend.[86] Even the British recognize Weygand's hostility to the Germans and collaboration[87]. An American observer "just returned from Casablanca, where he was either first or second in command in our office", is of opinion that "Weygand's collaboration with the Germans is unthinkable".[88] According to Murphy, Weygand recently secured the reduction of an undertaking made in Vichy, without consultation with Weygand, to furnish the Axis in Libya 40,000 to 50,000 tons of wheat. A reduction to 8000 tons was made on Weygand's argument that France lacked transport facilities, that crops were short, and that there was danger of famine in North Africa[89]. Again, Weygand, according to Murphy, recently refused flatly to accept a German proposal, made through Vichy, which asked permission to allow the distribution of an illustrated publication, printed in French and Arabic concerning German military strength[90]. Finally, Commander Hillenkoetter asserts that Weygand's army will never be found fighting on the side of the Germans.[91]

---

[82] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

[83] Algiers, Secret Tel., #473, Sept. 25, 1941.

[84] Algiers, Secret Tel., #525, Oct. 23, 1941.

[85] Cf. supra, and Vichy, Secret Tel., #1350, Oct. 20, 1941

---

[86] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1340, Oct. 17, 1941.

[87] N.I.D., 0100, Aug. 26, 1941.

[88] Personal interview.

[89] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

(c) Ports

The question of the North African ports is a crucial one. It is correspondingly difficult and confusing. The Germans, in bringing pressure in an effort to secure one or more of the ports, seem to be following their usual practice of avoiding, if possible, the clear joining of the issue. French resistance has been not inconsiderable; but in the end, the Germans have a good chance, unless their hand is forced, of gaining their end without being technically guilty of flagrant aggression.

A report persists that, on August 11 of this year, Vichy agreed to the German demands on the North African ports. In one form, the report suggests, somewhat plausibly, that a compromise agreement was made. However this may be, a report on the matter by Lyautey is not inconsistent. According to him, Darlan actually signed an agreement with the Germans to turn over to them as bases Bizerta, Casablanca, and Dakar; but Pétain is said to have refused point blank to acknowledge the agreement and to have annuled it[92].

---

[90] Algiers, Secret Tel., #504, Oct. 14, 1941.

[91] O.N.I., F-3, Confident., #152, Oct. 7, 1941.

There is evidence that Weygand has been firm in his resistance to pressure concerning German use of Bizerta and other bases in Africa, though the pressure is said to have become stronger because of British damage to Tripoli and to Benghazi. Weygand is said to have threatened to resign several times on the issue[93].

Evidence that the Germans will gain their ends by indirection is to be seen in the matter of the establishment of consulates in North Africa, other than in Tunisia. An American report of October 13 of this year prophesied that Vichy would yield on the question of a German consulate at Algiers[94]. Three days later, a similar report stated that Weygand was not consenting but that he was being kept in the dark in the matter[95]; and a subsequent report testified to Noguès's opposition[96]. On October 23, Weygand was constrained to admit that the Germans would have the consulates[97]. Murphy admits that this gives the Germans a serious entering wedge; and he is doubtless reflecting Weygand's apologia when he observes that German pressure was yielded to only after seven months of dilatory treatment by Vichy of the Germans[98]. The persistent nature of German pressure is evidenced by a report that already the Germans are pressing for full consular rights and even for their former extraterritorial rights[99].

---

[92] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., Aug. 31, 1941.

[93] Naval At., Vichy, Confident., Aug. 20, 1941.

---

[94] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1306, Oct. 13, 1941.

[95] Algiers, Secret Tel., #512, Oct. 16, 1941.

[96] Casablanca, Secret Tel., #569, Oct. 29, 1941.

[97] Algiers, Secret Tel., #525, Oct. 23, 1941.

[98] Algiers, Secret Tel., #539, Oct. 28, 1941.

[99] Casablanca, Secret Tel., #580, Nov. 2, 1941.

(d) Active Resistance

From Weygand's somewhat stiff position on collaboration there cannot be deduced the likelihood that he will resist Germany with force of arms. The situation has been well summarized by a highly competent American military observer, who says that Weygand has little will to resist and no military equipment with which to do so. The latter consideration is naturally all-important.

Weygand has of course said that he will defend Africa against any aggressor. Murphy reports that, at the beginning of October of this year, Weygand asserted to him with emphasis that this intention to defend North Africa against the Germans had changed in no way[100]. Lyautey reports that Weygand's theme is, has been, and will be "we will resist the aggressor no matter who he may be"[101].

---

[100] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

[101] Naval At., Madrid, Confident., Sept. 2, 1941 (#5149)

Statements of this kind by Weygand are almost certainly merely for effect. However, Admiral Leahy, in a definition of his concept of our policy, suggests that it is "based on the view that when the time comes for decision Weygand may be moved to resist the Germans"[102]. Murphy likewise gives it as his opinion that if the Axis unkertakes aggressive action in French Africa, the French will take up arms. He adds that this will be more certain if the United States gives prompt military support[103]. This view is based on the supposition, generally accepted in the summer of 1941, that the German occupation of North Africa will take place by sudden aggression and not by slow diplomatic pressure.

The Free French, while recognizing Weygand's opposition to collaboration, do not think that Weygand will actively resist Germany. They are probably psychologically sound in their somewhat biased judgment that Weygand will find it hard to fight on the side of Britain in view of the fact that he, unlike de Gaulle, has been proved wrong in his judgment concerning British resistance. They say he has not the courage to admit his mistake in this[104]. They stress his old age and his lack of "goût de risque".[105]

---

[102] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1225, Sept. 25, 1941.

[103] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

There can be little doubt but that the view is correct which suggests that Weygand is unlikely to fight. Being aware of his small and ill-equipped forces, he will not, as a military man, attempt resistance against hopeless odds; and his age and temperament make this decision doubly reasonable. The general condition for his fighting would be strong likelihood of winning. This means that he would need considerable equipment for his own forces, as well as help from forces likely to prove superior to the Germans. According to letters written in January of this year from Catroux to de Gaulle and to the British Foreign Secretary, Weygand was convinced that operations would have to be resumed at some future date if certain conditions should be met. These, it was said, included adequate anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns for Weygand and assurance of quick victory, in view of his conviction that the native populations of North Africa would not endure a war for more than six months[106]. On the other hand, according to the Free French Intelligence Service, Weygand intimated to an emissary of Catroux that if acceptance of collaboration by Vichy should precede attack, he would enter a last protest and withdraw, arguing that he is an old and broken man.[107]

---

[104] Cf. letter of de Gaulle in Free French files in Washington.

[105] Cf. ibid.

(e) Relations With Vichy

According to the Free French, Weygand will never oppose Vichy. They stress the fact that he obeys Darlan even though exceedingly hostile to him; and they somewhat illogically suggest that this proves Weygand is more hostile to de Gaulle and Great

---

[106] Cf. letter of de Gaulle in Free French files in Washington.

[107] Naval At., London, Confident., Aug. 19, 1941.

Britain than to Darlan. Weygand's protests to Vichy, the Free French assert he has said, are made because he thinks it his duty to protest, this action easing his conscience and relieveing him of responsibility[108].

A Military Attaché report from Tangier[109] states that Weygand, in a talk to his officers, tried to dispel any misapprehension about his loyalty to Pétain. He is said to have made it clear that there existed no tacit approval of the de Gaulle movement either by himself or by Pétain. The need for this talk possibly has a small amount of significance.

It is probably true that Weygand, as a military man, will normally obey his superiors. For a time, this meant only that he would be obligated to obey Petain; but, as has been seen, he has more recently been subject to orders from Darlan as well. His obedience may still reasonably be assumed. This is true in spite of the fact that, as Murphy reported in October of this year, Weygand has been greatly irritated at the development of his relations with Vichy[110]. This irritation is easily understandable. He cannot, as a distinguished general, relish his position as a subordinate of **Admiral** Darlan. Nor can he approve of the addition to his staff of Darlan's agent, Admiral Fenard[111]. Weygand's title as Delegate General can scarcely compensate in his eyes for his being deprived of military command. The suggestion that appointment of Huntziger to command of the North African forces represented no real change in the situation[112] is hardly convincing. The suggestion that Huntzinger was sent by Pétain in order to gain time in withstanding pressure from the Germans[113] was unlikely to impress Weygand, whose relations with Huntzinger were said to be very bad. Weygand's statement that he fully approved appointment of Juin, Koeltz, and Delattre-Detassigny because of his conviction that they were anti-collaborationist[114] ought probably to be received with some caution.

---

[108] Naval At., London, Confident., Aug. 19, 1941.

[109] Aug. 16, 1941.

---

[110] Algiers, Secret Tel., #492, Oct. 8, 1941.

[111] Cf. supra.

[112] Algiers, Secret Tel., #525, Oct. 23, 1941.

[113] Geneva, Secret Tel., #101, Oct. 31, 1941.

Suggestions that Weygand's position, since his recent visit to Vichy, remains satisfactory leave the impression of over-protesting. Near the end of October, Weygand's aide assured Cole that Weygand's position was intact[115]; and, a day later, Murphy was told by Weygand himself that his position was in no way changed[116]. About a week later, Murphy's report admits that Weygand was "under heavy fire" during his Vichy trip[117]. Weygand, he says, recognizes that his position is difficult but hopes to be able to withstand the pressure[118].

---

[114] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1267, Oct. 4, 1941.

[115] Algiers, Secret Tel., #523, Oct. 22, 1941.

[116] Algiers, Secret Tel., #525, Oct. 23, 1941.

[117] Algiers, Secret Tel., #544, Oct. 29, 1941.

The existence of a feud between Weygand and Darlan has been generally accepted. On the other hand, somewhat persistent reports suggest, as has been seen, that Darlan has changed his mind about the outcome of the war, believing now that Germany cannot win. If this is true, relations between Darlan and Weygand can naturally be expected to rest on a different basis.

It is commonly said that Weygand would cut loose from Vichy if the Germans should take over all of France. This promise is usually not examined very far. It is difficult to see how Weygand would thereby be in a better position to resist the Germans by force of arms.

2. Nogués.

Nogués's position is in some ways analogous to that of Weygand. Hope has been placed in his disposition to resist collaboration with Germany; and, for this or some other reason, he has been relieved of military command.

---

[118] Algiers, Secret Tel., #544, Oct. 29, 1941.

At the time that the Free French hoped to get possession of all French colonies, they saw Noguès as holding the key to the situation. They thought that if he had joined Free France, the whole Empire would have done so. It is suggested that Noguès was unwilling to be under the command of de Gaulle, a man of lesser army rank than himself[119].

Noguès is said to be inclined to temporize and to be conciliatory, evading a definite stand where possible. It is said that this explains the colourless character of the officials in Morocco.[120]

Noguès, upon being deprived of his military command, remained as Resident General of Morocco. He is said to have engaged in intrigue with Darlan with a view to undermining the position of Weygand[121].

Noguès is apparently anti-British. He, however, is almost certainly strongly anti-German. His position on either side would scarcely be of great moment; but his support is well worth having.

---

[119] Military At., London (R. S.-2567-1-314), May 20, 1941.

[120] Private interview.

[121] Ibid.

3. Boisson

Governor General Boisson of the much discussed Dakar and French West Africa is a careerist in the French colonial service. He is by training prone to obey his superiors. After wavering somewhat at the time of the Armistice, he determined in the end that his loyalty belonged to Vichy. He gave this as his reason for opposing the British and Free French in September of 1940, for which action he was officially praised and decorated by Vichy.

Boisson has vigorously asserted that he will oppose anyone who attacks Dakar[122]. He likewise insists that he has the gold of the Bank of France safe under his protection[123]. The port of Dakar is apparently being made progressively stronger under Boisson[124]. He alleges that he fears attack by the United States[125]; but he favours extension to West Africa of the Franco-American economic agreement[126].

---

[122] Dakar, Secret Tel., #364, Oct. 29, 1941.

[123] Dakar, Secret Tel., #343, Oct. 5, 1941.

[124] N.I.D., 0064 Situation Rept., No. 6, Aug. 6, 1941.

[125] Dakar, Secret Tel., #364, Oct. 29, 1941.

[126] Dakar, Secret Tel., #344, Oct. 6, 1941.

One report states that Boisson would disobey Weygand if instructed to collaborate with the British,[127] and another asserts that he would resign if Weygand should be dismissed[128]. Boisson has said that he would not allow the Germans to enter Dakar[129]; but a plausible suggestion points out that the Germans might gain their end by securing his removal.

Boisson, according to report, believes that the war will end through a negotiated peace[130].

CONCLUSION: Weygand, with whom may be associated for practical purposes Noguès and Boisson, is beyond reasonable doubt definitely opposed to collaboration with Germany. At the present time, he is, as a French patriot, anti-German and anti-Italian. There is no evidence that he has approved any action that would go beyond strict adherence to the terms of the Armistice. There is some indication that he has opposed action clearly within the terms.

---

[127] Private interview.

[128] Vichy, Secret Tel., #1231, Sept. 27, 1941.

[129] N.I.D., loc. cit.

[130] Dakar, Secret Tel., #364, Oct. 29, 1941.

Whether or not Weygand would carry resistance to the point of again taking up arms is a much more difficult question. There are certainly imaginable circumstances in which he would do so, and others in which he would not. The Germans doubtless know this. In general, it would be a mistake, in attempting to anticipate possible and probable concatenations of circumstances, to assume that Weygand will be faced with a clear-cut situation. The Germans will almost certainly see to this. Hence, of the possible actions for Weygand--armed resistance, submission, and resignation--either of the two latter appears more probable than the first.

SECRET

THE GERMAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN IBERIA

Western European and Mediterranean Sections

SECRET

THE GERMAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN IBERIA

Summary and Conclusion

A. Spain

1) Spanish Foreign Policy. Since the outbreak of the present war Spain has followed a policy of non-belligerency. The people of Spain wish to be left alone; they would resent the passage of German troops through Spain. Franco and the Falangist leaders on the other hand have appeared definitely predisposed to the Axis and would grant passage through Spain under threat of force; they might even actively collaborate if the Germans promised food, petroleum products, and large colonial rewards.

2) The economic situation in Spain is desperate. If the Germans pass through Spain, Spain will lose all her current imports. Without food and petroleum products from the outside there is likelihood of internal turmoil discreditable to the "new order." Such a situation would not be to Germany's advantage, and therefore, as a possible price of passage, the Germans would feel obligated to make up the loss in imports.

3) Whereas the political situation in Spain is not harmonious, there is no reason to expect a recrudescence of revolution, nor is there reason to believe that German occupation would precipitate significant political disturbances.

B. Portugal

A German passage through Spain almost automatically implies German control of Portugal. It is doubtful if Portugal would put up even token resistance. The economic situation in Portugal is not yet critical, and an occupation would not put the Germans under the same immediate responsibilities as in Spain.

C. Costs of a German Occupation

The Costs of a German occupation of Iberia may be summarized:

1) Costs of maintaining a minimal force of occupation.

2) Necessity of bolstering the Spanish economy, and in the future, perhaps the Portuguese.

3) Loss of Spain and Portugal as entrepôts for German trade.

4) Loss of Lisbon as an observation and espionage center.

D. Conclusion: The Germans can occupy Iberia whenever ready to move against French Morocco. The costs will be small in terms of the stake.

SECRET

THE GERMAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN IBERIA

A. Spain

1) Spain's Foreign Policy:

The German conquest of French North Africa is expected to take the form of a pincer movement, one arm of which will move south from France through Spain. In taking this step the Germans must face the usual difficulties of a considerable transit and in this particular case must be willing to accept unusual responsibilities and costs which proceed from the special situation in Spain.

Spain has followed the policy of non-belligerency for good reason. The revolution and the subsequent economic and political weakness have made any military effort virtually impossible. To stay out of the present war has become the policy which the Spanish have been forced to follow. Franco himself has shared this view. Several reports indicate that in April 1941 the Germans put strong pressure upon Spain to enter the war on their side, or if not to enter, at least to grant a right-of-way to a German force. Franco resisted, though it is reported that he agreed to enter the war if Germany should capture the Suez Canal. The Germans are reported to have exerted similar pressure in August with the same negative results.[1]

Admiral Moreno told the United States Naval Attaché that Spain's only desire was to be left alone and to be able to remain in her present state of neutrality.[2]

No matter how vigorously Spanish leaders and the Spanish people protest their desire for independence there is however little evidence to indicate that they would oppose a German entrance into Spain by force. Spain is totally unable to resist the force which the Germans would use and Spanish acquiescence to the German transit would be given in advance of any German move by virtue of a threat backed up by armed superiority. The Spanish army, numbering between five hundred thousand and five hundred fifty thousand men[3], is neither well-fed nor well-equipped. Its disposition in the south of Spain, with about one-third of its forces stationed in Spanish Morocco, precludes the possibility of any effective defense of the country.

---

[1] NID Situation Report, August 11, 1941; Accession 2583, "Q"

[2] Naval Attaché, Madrid, August 20, 1941

[3] Naval Attaché, Madrid, September 17, 1941, quoting two British estimates

The likelihood of Spain's taking positive action against Germany is slim, for the country is being given large quantities of German propaganda and the whole philosophy of the Franco regime is naturally pro-Axis. A German-Spanish agreement for the exchange of workers was signed during the late summer of 1941. A Spanish "Blue Legion" has been recruited for the Russian campaign, though hatred of Russia might have been more important in this enterprise than love for Germany.

Franco, Serrano Suñer, and most of the principals in the government have made at one time or another strong pro-Axis pronouncements, and although the British report that Franco's pro-Axis speech in July 1941 disgusted many people and angered some of the Generals, pro-Axis statements continue to be made. A competent observer, however, stated that he was not entirely convinced that such oratory represented the true feelings of Franco and Serrano Suñer. For, he points out, the Spanish leaders dare not say anything favorable toward the democracies lest it cause an immediate German occupation of Spain. Except for this possible reservation the existing evidence indicates that the Franco regime is strongly biased in favor of Germany and will do all that it can safely do to help Hitler win the war.

The Germans are in a strong position to play to the imperialist ambitions of the Franco government. In the last year or so the Falangist party has made a point of stating its rights to Gibraltar and French Morocco. Inscriptions have appeared on Madrid buildings calling for Casablanca, Fez, Oran and Algiers. There is even some discussion in Falangist circles of Spain's controlling all of Africa lying west of a line drawn between Oran and Capetown.[4] It is manifestly ridiculous for the Spanish to seek British or French help in realizing these ambitions. Germany is the power which, on paper at least, is willing to make the greatest concessions. It should be remembered, however, that within the vague outline of German geopolitical theory there is the vision of a German-Spanish control of Northwest and West Africa. Within the German scheme Spain will be a servant state which in turn would have a large share in the administration of Northwest and West Africa. This would permit the Germans to use Spain as an intermediary in their development of commercial relations with Latin America. At the present moment there is a tendency amongst Spaniards to close their eyes to the dubious benefits of holding an empire for German use, and a willingness to be unreasoningly enthusiastic over the hope of re-establishing their past glory.[5]

---

[4] New York Times, June 12, 1941

The above summarizes the main reasons for Spanish willingness to permit a German passage through Spain, but in any calculations, either German or Spanish, the internal economic and political situation of Spain will demand serious consideration by both parties.

2. The Economic Situation in Spain and Spanish Morocco.

The situation which is likely to cause the Germans the greatest amount of concern is largely economic in nature. Spain, devastated by the Civil War is on the verge of economic collapse. Indebted to Germany[6] and Italy for their assistance during the Civil War, and indebted to other states for unpaid imports, Spain is at the same time struggling to meet desperate shortages in her internal economy. The shortages of first importance are those of food, gasoline, and lubricating oils. To a lesser degree the want of rubber, tin plate, hides, and raw cotton is critical.[7] In October there was , however, a stock pile of some two hundred twenty-four thousand bales of cotton--an amount calculated to occupy Spanish mills until January 1, 1942.[8]

---

[5] See Supporting Study: Germany's "Eurafrican" Objectives.......

[6] Commercial Attaché, Madrid, September 8, 1941, refers to German credits in Spain of 100,000,000 marks.

The Spanish food supply is now rigorously rationed and there is grave concern in government circles lest this winter's wheat supply fall short of the quantity demanded by the now-operating rationing system. It has been computed that a full grain supply allows a per capita consumption of one hundred fifty-seven kilos per annum. At present the per capita allotment has been reduced to ninety to ninety-two kilos, an amount which must again be reduced if the present crop prognoses prove correct.[9] According to these the expected shortage will be between three and five hundred thousand tons (between ten and sixteen per cent of the expected total harvest).[10] Rice is being rationed in the Valencia region.[11]

---

[7] See reports of U.S. agents in Spain and Spanish territory, notably Accessions 2170 and 3082; telegrams of Ambassador Weddell.

[8] U.S. Consul General, Barcelona, October 3, 1941

[9] Commercial Attaché, Madrid, September 19, 1941

[10] Commercial Attaché, Madrid, August 30, September 19, 1941

[11] U.S. Consulate, Valencia, September 26, 1941

Although the 1941 yield is better than that of 1940, the prospects are nevertheless disappointing, and, owing to a shortage of fertilizers, the outlook for 1942 is little better. Every recent report has confirmed Spain's need for more food: the papal nuncio after traveling throughout the country expressed his grave concern to Ambassador Weddell on October 7, 1941; a well-informed citizen of Málaga has described the hard conditions of life in his city;[12] Colonel Crockett, Chief of the American Red Cross Mission, who visited Seville province in February 1941, found that thousands were starving, that there was insufficient milk for ten thousand children; practically all news reports from Spain note scarcity of staples and exceedingly high prices. It is, however, the opinion of one well informed reporter that starvation is by no means general. There are areas of the country which are able to produce small surpluses, which if nationally distributed would considerably alleviate the present situation.

The problem of distribution thus becomes a crucial one in meeting the food shortage. But the problem of distribution seems beyond immediate solution. As noted above, there is a shortage of high grade petroleum products which is being met by drastic rationing. No gasoline cards are issued to taxicab owners or owners of private touring cars whose vehicles are rated above eighteen horsepower. Owners whose cars are thus put out of circulation have been obliged to store them during the first week of September and make known the place of storage so that government inspectors can assure themselves that the cars are actually out of use. The ration for official cars has been reduced another twenty-five per cent.[13]

---

[12] Commercial Attaché, Málaga, July 30, 1941, enclosed this document in one of his reports to the State Department.

These restrictions were necessitated by the fact that Spain's already limited consumption was exceeding stores on hand and imports. On July 1 there were forty-three thousand tons of gasoline on hand, and between July 1 and August 19 Spain was able to import twenty-one thousand six hundred tons from the United States and Tenerife. With a restricted monthly consumption of twenty-five thousand tons the gasoline supply was barely enough to suffice.[14] Rubber for automobile tires is all but unprocurable.[15]

---

[13] Commercial Attaché, Madrid, August 18, 1941.
[14] Naval Attaché, Madrid, August 20, 1941.
[15] Commercial Attaché, Madrid, August 18, 1941.

The Spanish railroads, in turn, are in a desperate condition of disrepair, largely because of the lack of high grade lubricants. They are operating at an estimated efficiency of forty per cent; the paucity of passenger rolling stock has made it worth while changing the cars of the old Orient Express over to the Spanish gauge.[16] Another report refers to the railroad system as paralyzed.[17] Thus, although the Spanish road net is good and the railroad system (when in a proper state of repair) adequate for Spanish needs, neither is able to fulfill the function for which it was constructed.

The critical situation described above exists today in spite of an agreement negotiated with Great Britain and signed on February 26, 1941, by which Britain agreed to relax her blockade and to extend Spain a credit of two million pounds for the purchase of British goods. The agreement was subsequently extended to permit Spanish purchases from Portuguese colonies and other areas of the world where Britain had a favorable bilateral balance. By virtue of the relaxation of the blockade and trade agreements with Latin America Spain was able to import some one hundred forty thousand bales of cotton from Brazil and Argentina, as well as three hundred fifty thousand tons of grain. Through the British loan Spain was able to acquire fifteen thousand tons of Canadian and fifty thousand tons of Argentinian wheat. Spain was also able to arrange to exchange cotton goods with French Morocco and receive phosphates in return; this transaction, however, has been only partially successful. The Orient has been able to furnish small amounts of rubber carried in Spanish ships. The United States, still creditor to Spain for twelve million dollars on cotton alone, has been reluctant to issue more credits to a government which may move from collaboration with the Axis to actual military alliance.[18] The needs of national defense have further restricted our willingness to supply certain goods of strategic importance.

---

[16] U.S. Embassy, Madrid, October 13, 1941.

[17] Naval Attaché, Madrid, August 20, 1941

Thus, extension of credits and relaxation of the blockade have not succeeded in raising the Spanish economic situation above critical levels.

The situation in Spanish Morocco has been even graver than that in Metropolitan Spain. It is noteworthy that the very first ship carrying grain from Latin America unloaded in Spanish Morocco, where its need was most urgently felt.[19]

---

[18] Telegrams: Ambassador Weddell to the Secretary of State, September 16, 1941; Secretary of State to Ambassador Weddell, September 18, 1941; Ambassador Weddell to Secretary of State, September 23, 1941.

Largely as a result of the economic stringencies described above an epidemic of typhus has appeared in Spain. This disease, which has already appeared in every town in Andalusia, and which is spreading not only throughout Spain but also into Portugal, France and North Africa, is destined to put another drain upon Spanish resources. Dr. J. H. Janney of the Rockefeller Foundation, who returned from Spain this summer, after almost a year and a half in the country considers this epidemic to be so intense that it may become an international problem. Some authorities have taken heart at the news, reasoning that the disease hazard might restrain a German desire to march through Spain. The disease, however, is one which is easily guarded against by any organization which possesses adequate supplies of soap and delousing facilities. Medical advice scouts the idea that the existance of typhus in Spain would in any way deter a German transit.

---

[19] Morocco, ICIS, November 1940

Besides attempting to restore prosperity in Spain by agreements with foreign states, the Falangist government has tried to meet the economic crisis by regimenting Spanish economy. The program of state controlled economy embraces all productive and distributive efforts in Spain. Despite clear evidence that the system has not been successful, that it has even retarded instead of stimulated production, the Franco government appears determined to continue with it. Industrialists have almost unanimously complained that government interference through the Syndicates, often directed by Falange tyros, is as hard to overcome as the actual shortage of materials.[20] Ambassador Weddell has recently confirmed this report and asserts that increased regimentation has caused the regime significant loss of prestige and approbation among its former friends.[21] In short, it appears as if the government were not only adding to the economic confusion, by its regulative efforts, but also damaging its own chances of political survival.

---

[20] Commercial Attaché, Madrid, February 17, 1941 and August 11, 1941; see also, Commercial Attaché, Barcelona, September 5, 1941, which describes some of the regulations imposed upon Barcelona industry and commerce.

[21] Telegram, Madrid, October 28, 1941.

3. Political Situation

Opposition to the Franco regime exists in many quarters. First, and most notably, there are the supporters of the former Republic, who have either been driven under cover or imprisoned. The actual number of political prisoners is a matter of some dispute. Estimates vary all the way from one hundred fifty thousand given by a competent observer recently returned from Spain, to seven hundred thousand.[22] The United States Naval Attaché at Madrid reported on July 30, 1941 that there were forty-seven labor battalions of four hundred eighty to eight hundred men each scattered throughout Spain,[23] a total number of only twenty-two thousand five hundred to thirty-seven thousand six hundred.

Second, the rivalry between the Falange Party (which has developed into the principal beneficiary of the Franco regime), and the Army has created a small but important group of disgruntled people. Usually referred to as the "Generals", the object of their most special disapprobation would seem to have been Serrano Suñer, Franco's present Foreign Minister. Reports from British sources indicate that this group of Generals, which includes such important men as Aranda, Varela, Vigon and Orgaz, had decided that Serrano Suñer must go. They deputized Orgaz to inform Franco of their decision and apparently were determined, if need be, to get rid of Franco himself.[24] Other British reports claimed that family difficulties had created bad relations between Franco and his brother-in-law, Serrano Suñer. Still another British Situation Report maintained that a group opposed to Serrano Suñer and his war policy was gathering strength within the Falange party and was pledging its support to Miguel Primo de Rivera, Minister of Agriculture and son of the late Dictator. These signs of unrest within the party are borne out by at least one recent shift in personnel: German Alvariz Sotomayor was dismissed from his post as Secretary General of the Spanish Syndicates. Later he was denied the right to hold any position of power or trust for the next two years and placed under arrest.[25]

---

[22] This figure was given to our Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 17, 1941, by the Chief of Prison Camps in Spain.

[23] ONI Intelligence Report, Naval Attaché, Madrid, July 30, 1941 (Rating A)

---

[24] British NID, August 14, 1941.

[25] Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, October 8, 1941. A British source recounts the resignation of Espiñosa, Spanish Ambassador to Berlin, because of a disagreement over foreign policy. Accession 424, September 18. 1941.

of the triangle."[18]

Similarly, Rear Admiral Donner in a recent speech points out: "The projecting corner of West Africa is the natural eastern end of a blockade line which enables an extra-European power dominating the Atlantic to make questionable German use of African territory." The United States, Donner declares, is the power most interested in establishing a foothold in West Africa; in fact, it is our logical next step. In his opinion it will be Germany's vital interest to forestall this eventuality.[19]

In another connection Rockel further suggests that Gibraltar's important position be neutralized as much as possible. Casablanca flanks Gibraltar on the Atlantic, while Bizerta and Oran do so on the Mediterranean. In the hands of a power opposed to England they might render Gibraltar nearly useless. To make West Africa even more attractive to the Nazis Rockel also enumerates the sites for good military air bases. Granted German success in Russia, Weygand's days in North Africa would seem limited.

---

[18] Carter, W. Horsfall, "Spain and the Axis", Foreign Affairs, October 1941, p. 176.

[19] Donner, Konteradmiral, "Geographie und Seemacht", Wissen und Wehr, May 1941, p. 153 ff.

b) The Long-run View

From the long term point of view, the outlook for France in North and West Africa is just as dark. With Germany ruling the world the best it could hope for (as portrayed in Geopolitik) was a free pan-Arab state[20] on its opposite Mediterranean shore. But this possibility was probably little more than a diplomatic manoeuvre to create difficulty for France while it was still fighting. Much more likely is outright German domination. While pointing out that France is not fitted, nor does it need to be a colonial power because of its declining birth rate[21], Geopolitik writers also note (falsely) that the North Africa economy merely brings a surplus to France, while it would be a very fine complement for the economy of higher middle latitude Germany[22]. Furthermore, "Who possesses Tunis controls the traffic between eastern and western Mediterranean ports... and also has a position which dominates the Sahara."[23] These facts probably will be much more influential in the final German decision that the fantastic, ill-considered engineering scheme publicized in this country[24] of damming all the Mediterranean straits, and making a garden out of the northern Sahara.

---

[20] Haebler, R. G., "Saudi-Arabien", Z.f.G. XVIII, 1941, pp. 328-34; Leifer, W., "Der Freiheitskampf der Araber", Z.f.G., XVIII, 1940, pp. 65-70; Lindermann, H., "Der Islam in Aufbruck und Angriff", Z.f.G., XVI, 1939, pp. 784-9.

---

[21] Obst, Erich, "Lebensräume der Weltvölker", Z.f.P., v. 29, 1939, pp. 1-10; Carter, W. Horsfall, "Spain and the Axis", Foreign Affairs, October 1941, p. 176; Gley, Werner, "Frankreich und sein Kolonialreich im Lichte der Bevölkerungswissenschaft", Z.f.G. XVII, 1940, 214-20.

[22] Obst, Erich, "Lebensräume der Weltvölker", Z.f.P., v. 29, 1939, p. 5.

[23] Siewert, Wolf, "Frankreichs Stellung in Mittlemeer" Z.f.G., XII, 1935, p. 755

[24] Rotschild, Julie, "Germans Plan New Continent of 'Atlantropa'", New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 3, 1941, Sect. 2, p.3. (This article discusses a project proposed by a certain Hermann Soergel. No evidence has been found or shown that the "geopolitical school" have paid any attention to this, or that he is connected with them.)

In all discussion of the North African question Italy receives some notice as a partner[28], but it is to be observed that, although Italian claims on Tunisia are mentioned, German writers are careful never to stake out any specific claims for Italy in Africa or elsewhere. Italy's prospects thus would seem to be little better in Africa than before the present war.

2) South and East Africa

Although Germans feel that much can be done with north andwest Africa their hopes run highest for south and east Africa, which are much more white man's lands. The return of German Southwest Africa to the "motherland" is a foregone certainty, for all Geopolitik writers who mention it do so in the most sentimental fashion. Almost as certain is German domination of the South African Union. For some reason, apparently because they regard the Boers as kinsmen, Geopolitik writers feel that they have a claim on the Union. "The cultural importance of this purely Teutonically oriented country (Riesenreich) for the future cannot be underestimated."[29] "We Germans should be more interested in South Africa than in any other region of settlement in the world, for here German culture and the German way of life can yet take root."[30] Appeals and promises thus are addressed to the Boers. "The coming settlement of the Southwest question will be accompanied by a complete understanding between Germans and Boers."[31] Also "In the immediate interest of the young Europe, the domination of the Afrikaners in South Africa, their position as masters over the black mass, should be strengthened and assured by every possible means."[32] No wonder then that "now also is the time on the southern tip of the Black Continent for a cooperative German settlement:

---

[28] Siewert, Wolf, "Italiens Kampf um die Mittelmeerherrschaft", Z.f.G., XII, 1935, pp. 770 -81; Wittschell, Leo, "Die Tunesische Frage", Z.F.G., IV, 1927, pp. 1058-63.

---

[29] Oertzen, A. V., "Afrikanische Kolonisationsprobleme", Z.f.G. IV, 1928, pp. 62-71

[30] Obst, Erich, "Lebensräume der Weltvölker", Z.f.P., v. 29, 1939, p. 65

[31] Eisen, J. V., "Südafrika im Gesamtdeutschen Raum", Z.f.G. XVIII, 1941, p. 273.

[32] Gulcher, Edwin, "Weltpolitik von Südafrika aus Gesehen", Z.f.G., XVII, 1940, p. 23

'Adveniat regnum teutonicum'."[33]

East Africa is to be an extension of this German nucleus in South Africa, for it "certainly has a great future before itself". And "it is to be hoped that in the future Germans will develop this region even more intensively (than during the former occupation)."[34]

3) The Western Mediterranean

Although German relations with Spain are much more delicate subjects for discussion than plans for Africa, the course recommended by Geopolitik is as clear as the African policy. From 1933 to 1940 the historic principle set forth by Ewald Banse[35] was the basis of German-Spanish relations. "Spain is Germany's natural ally against France....and the rise of both powers depends on France's downfall....it must be our first interest to make Spain strong again." In pursuing this policy Germany has constantly sought the establishment of a

---

[33] Eisen, J. V., "Südafrika im Gesamtdeutschen Raum", Z.f.G., XVIII, 1941, p. 273

[34] Oertzen, A. V., "Afrikanische Kolonisationsprobleme", Z.f.G. IV, 1938, p. 70.

[35] Banse, Ewald, "Germany Prepares for War", New York, 1934, p. 316

Though it is true that Serrano Suñer has numerous enemies and that he is usually blamed for the state of the nation, most of these reports should be sceptically received. According to a competent observer the Foreign Minister's influence and power in the government have increased rather than diminished during the fall of 1941.[26] Moreover, it has been reported that the opposition to Serrano Suñer and Franco which arises from rivalries within the Falange Party or from jealousies between the party and the Army is the very kind now being checked by fear of popular uprising.

Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful that the restlessness of the Generals represents a potential coup d'état which would elevate an anti-German group to power. One observer asserts that the Spanish army officers are ardent Germanophiles almost to a man and that they nurse well-established resentments against England and France.[27] In the opinion of another observer the struggle between the Generals and the Party is purely domestic.

Neither element is favorable to the democracies. The one conclusion which the foregoing facts indicate is that the government is not able to put an end to the economic difficulties and that the persistence of these difficulties in turn has caused friction within the government and a consequent loss of confidence in it.

---

[26] Accession 423, July 15, 1941

[27] Carter, W. Horsfall, Contemporary Review, Dec. 1940

B. Portugal

Any German passage through Spain is almost sure to imply German control of Portugal. The Portuguese friendship with England and the possibility of a British attack on the German flank through Lisbon make it essential that the Germans take the necessary precautions. In so doing the costs will be considerably lighter than those involved in the Spanish problem.

The economic situation in Portugal is very different from that in Spain. The government of Salazar has been financially sound and the economic condition of the country is prosperous in comparison to that of Spain. It is true that food shortages have begun to appear throughout the country[28] and have produced riots[29]; it is likewise true that the rationing of gasoline has begun[30] and that the reduced imports of rubber tires is creating difficulties in the transportation system.[31] But in many ways Portugal has been benefiting from her position as one of Europe's main ports of entry.

---

[28] U.S. Legation, Lisbon, October 4, 1941--mentions specific shortages in meat, sugar, rice and codfish.

[29] Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 11, 1941

[30] Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 23, 1941

Although strongly anti-German[32], Portugal has no power to resist Germany. In the last weeks the small metropolitan army (fifty thousand men)[33] has been weakened by moving some thirty thousand troops to various island garrisons.

Although the Germans could detail a Spanish force to occupy Lisbon, and although the Spanish would favor such a commission (as a possible first step to the ultimate annexation of Portugal), a well-informed source feels that this would be unlikely. The Germans would be unwilling to see hostilities between Spanish and Portuguese troops develop when they know that the overpowering strength of their own army would preclude the possibility of any Portuguese resistance. According to this source the Germans in all probability would thus undertake the occupation themselves.

---

[31] Accession 1416

[32] Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 17, 1941

[33] War Dept. Survey of Portugal, September 9, 1941

There is a fair presumption, based upon the removal of a large part of the Portuguese army to the Atlantic Islands, that Salazar would transfer the seat of government to the Azores and allow the Germans to take over.[34]

C. Costs to Germany of German Passage through Spain.

The passage of a German army through Spain would probably put the Germans under several disadvantages. In the first place, the moment that German troops crossed the Franco-Spanish frontier the British blockade would cut all of Iberia off from Western supplies. As has been pointed out, the already desperate situation in Spain would approach the danger point. Starvation and disease would follow unless the Germans were willing to bolster the Spanish economy. The Germans might feel impelled to do just this, not out of reasons of humanity, but out of two other extremely realistic motives: 1) To obviate the development of a political situation which might necessitate a large number of occupying troops; 2) To sustain the "New Order" in Spain which the Germans themselves have contributed so heavily to establish. Should a new revolution envelope the country and destroy Franco's efforts to create a Fascist Iberia the repercussions in German-occupied Europe and in Latin America might well be to the German disadvantage in the long run.

---

[34] Telegram, Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 17, 1941.

In order to prevent such a situation from developing the Germans would most certainly be obliged to furnish petroleum products and food. The other goods which Spain lacks, such as tin, rubber, raw cotton, and hides, are also scarce in Germany.

In addition to these positive costs there is the considerable negative cost to Germany which would come with the closing of the Atlantic ports. For some time the Germans have been able to use Spain and Portugal as entrepôts for trade with the outside world. It is difficult to gauge the importance of this function. Foreign Funds Control believes that the Spanish have in the main been honest in the use of their dollar accounts since June 1941. The only specific commodity which is now suspected of being transshipped is raw cotton, and maybe as much as twenty per cent of this commodity is passing on to Germany.

A third cost which the Germans must assume is the natural one of occupation. Granted that they would occupy only strategic centers along their route, and granted that troops of second or third quality would be competent for this task, nevertheless, this minimum drain on German man power is worth mentioning.

A fourth cost consists of the loss of Lisbon as an important observation post for espionage centers.[35]

D. Conclusion

In spite of the costs which the Germans would be forced to meet in passing through the Iberian peninsula, the Germans will in all probability occupy the peninsula whenever their strategy requires. Fighting, if any, would be negligible. Even sabotage, it is thought by a competent observer, would be less in Spain than in other occupied countries less thoroughly indoctrinated with Fascist ideas. The extent of the economic liability that the Iberian Peninsula, isolated from overseas trade, would be to Germany depends chiefly on the availability to Germany of the supplies and technical skill now needed in Spain. If Germany could spare food and other essential commodities, if she could spare trained men to straighten out the bungled business affairs of Spain, she would quickly produce improved conditions in the Peninsula. As for the political repercussions in Latin America, that would result from the entrance of the Nazis, they would probably vary with the nature of the arrangement made between Hitler and Franco. An arrangement which appeared to favor the Spanish pretensions to grandeur might conceivably win favor in Latin America, whereas an outright brutal invasion of Spain and Portugal would not.

---

[35] It should be noted that Lisbon is the major port for goods, mail and persons travelling between the western hemisphere and Europe. It is one of the few places where mail may arrive on the continent without having passed through a censor, and where persons may land without rigorous Allied questioning.

SECRET

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC STAKE IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

Economics Section

SECRET

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC STAKE IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

Summary and Conclusion

A. Long-Run German Advantages

In the long run, Germany stands to gain considerably by occupation. The completion of the road and railway linking North and West Africa would permit the steady flow of vegetable oils from West Africa to the Mediterranean, and open up inadequately exploited intervening regions. South West and perhaps South Africa would come gradually into the German orbit, especially if military forces of any magnitude could be located in West Africa; and above all the long run basis for close German-Latin American relations would be laid.

B. Immediate German Gains and Losses

As compared to its present economic position in North and West Africa, Germany has little to gain immediately by full occupation. From Northwest Africa phosphates, cobalt, molybdenum, olive oil, grains and other foodstuffs are now flowing in significant quantities to the European continent; while West Africa is furnishing an important, but irregularly available quantity of peanut and palm oil. Unless shipping facilities and protection for them can be mobilized to a much greater extent than at present, the immediate effect of occupation may, in fact, be some net economic loss. The French colonies south and east of Dakar might be lost to the continental economy; the British would make a more serious effort than at present to obstruct the Dakar-Casablanca sea route; shipping facilities and supplies would be diverted to supply the German forces engaged to hold the areas taken.

Specifically, there might be a net loss to the continent in peanut and palm oil, both badly needed. Against these losses would be set merely the more energetic exploitation and mobilization of resources now present and flowing, in greater or lesser amount, to the Continent, and a weakening in the already inadequate blockade of the Western Mediterranean.

C. Conclusion: An exact measure of Germany's net position after occupation depends heavily upon the form and extent of her military action and the Allied action taken to deal with it. The degree of collaboration or opposition evoked among the French and the natives is equally revelant. Exact judgment is therefore impossible at present. This, however, can be said: that the possible short-run gains or losses economically are so slight that they can not be considered a determining factor in the German decision.

SECRET

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC STAKE IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

A. Long-Run German Advantages

The long run economic advantages that might accrue to Germany through the political and military control of North and West Africa are difficult to gauge. They stem from two strategic consequences of occupation: free movement across the Mediterranean, from the European continent to the North African coast and hinterland; and easy, direct access to the South Atlantic trade routes. The latter would involve, of course, an intensification of commercial relations with South America and probably with South Africa, both by air and by sea. Control of the 'bulge', it is widely agreed, is in the long run a necessary and almost sufficient condition for German economic hegemony in Latin America and in Southwest and South Africa.

The long run economic advantages to be drawn from North and West Africa proper are somewhat easier to indicate. They would consist of the fullest possible exploitation of existing resources. In particular, Germany would probably attempt to develop further the mineral resources of the area. Thus far the major contribution of both North and West Africa has been agricultural. And for the duration of the War it will probably be in that direction that the Germans will look, if control is gained. In addition, as indicated below, useful quantities of cobalt, and perhaps a crucial quantity of phosphates are now available in North Africa. The array of mineral resources known to be present in West Africa is impressive. It includes:[1] diamonds, coal, petroleum, quartz, asbestos and other silicates, barium, calcium, iron, zinc, manganese, chrome, molybdenum, aluminum, thorium, lead, gold, silver, sulfur, garnet, tin, rutile, and copper. Equivalent lists for French North Africa, and even for Spanish Morocco, are hardly less inclusive. The full extent of such resources is, of course, not fully known. In some cases the amounts, on thorough investigation, will emerge as insignificant; in other cases, exploitation may prove uneconomical due to the availability of adequate cheaper supplies. It is evident that the Germans, in any case, will examine the availability of these minerals with the greatest care, especially if, for any period of time, they should continue to be denied access to resources elsewhere.[2]

---

[1] See mineral map, in Appendix A, "The Economic and Strategic Significance of West Africa," by Projects Section, Planning Division, Office of the Administrator of Export Control, August 27, 1941. The map was constructed by Henry Hubert, chief of the permanent mission for geological research, in French West Africa, 1922.

Such benefits, even in the long run, must be regarded as strictly subsidiary to the potentialities of free or even monopolistic relations with Latin America and South West and South Africa. That vista, and the short run consequences of occupation, are undoubtedly uppermost in the minds of German economic strategists.

B. Immediate German Gains and Losses

1. Northwest Africa

It is the conclusion of military analysts that the problem of North Africa may be separable from that of West Africa, especially in the short run; i.e., that German control of North Africa may not involve immediate and unequivocal control of West Africa. For that reason the economic advantantages consequent upon German control will be grouped by area. In each instance an effort will be made to answer the following questions: What commodities or services are available? In what quantity? What immediate importance have they for Germany? What relative importance, with respect to current German needs, do the quantities represent? It is perhaps needless to remark that exact information on German shortages and on North African stocks is exceedingly sparse.

---

[2] A recent German evaluation of the mineral potential of Morocco is the following (F. Friedensburg, Die Bergwirtschaft der Erde, Stuttgart, 1938, p. 185): "The economic and political importance of mining is not entirely insignificant. Minerals compose almost a third of Moroccan exports. Its phosphates and cobalt supply an important part of the world market. The hope of finding rich mineral deposits sharpened the political struggle of the great powers for Morocco, even though their potential value was overestimated. Phosphates are capable of development for a long period in the future. The same seems to be the case with respect to cobalt and lead ores. There are possibilities for the development of coal and petroleum. It is not to be overlooked that this country, which has only so recently been exploited by European colonization, might reveal hitherto undiscovered deposits of minerals."

For these purposes North Africa will be defined as including Tunisia, Algeria, French and Spanish Morocco. It is possible that the full possession of North Africa, thus defined, would carry with it control of Libya and perhaps Egypt. As a problem in military tactics North Africa cannot be isolated from the Near and Middle East. The economic analysis here, however, will be limited to the short run economic benefits to be derived by the Germans from occupation of the territory stretching roughly from Tunis to Casablanca.

In attempting to measure these benefits, we are comparing the present flow of goods to Europe and that which would flow quickly upon full German control. The German Armistice Commission at present superintends the disposition of North African production;[3] German agents or collaborationists control the phosphate, manganese, and cobalt mines.[4] Within the existing limits of transport facilities from North Africa to the Continent, it is likely that Germany is withdrawing, via France, those goods which it requires, and superintending the manner in which output is distributed. The degree to which Germany will profit economically from occupation thus depends intimately on whether occupation will either weaken the present inadequate British blockade or positively improve transport facilities. If it is assumed that the British blockade will not be affected, immediate German benefits reduce to those which might result from superior mobilization of materials within North Africa. Set off against this minor advantage would be the cost of maintaining a military force in the area. The neutralization of Gibraltar, and such slackening in the already loose British blockade as would be consequent upon it, emerges as crucial even to the short run economic exploitation of North Africa.

---

[3] See State, Casablanca, September 1, 1941, for terms of agreement whereby 15 billion francs of French merchandise are exchanged against 5 billion francs of German goods, at the fixed rate of 20 francs to the mark. The balance is applied to the French obligations under the Armistice Agreement.

[4] See State, Casablanca, January 30, 1941

It is likely that merchant vessels in North German ports are redundant. There are two routes that would most concern Germany after occupation: that from North Africa to Marseille and the other Continental ports; that from Dakar to North Africa. In the short run, unless full cooperation with the French navy were to be obtained, the Dakar-North Africa sea route will probably be less accessible to the Axis than at present. The neutralization of Gibraltar, however, might make the Western Mediterranean virtually free. The problem then facing Germany would be to transfer a part of its idle merchant fleet from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. This would be, without doubt, a difficult and dangerous operation, even with the cooperation of French, Spanish, and Portuguese authorities; but it might be undertaken if the Western Mediterranean were judged safe. In combination with the extension of land communications with West Africa and a more efficient and thorough administration of African resources, this complex of actions would offer the most resonable possibility of net economic gain to Germany.

All commercial reports from North and West French Africa agree that a deterioration in fixed capital has occured since the Armistice of June 1940.[5] Railways are overworked, with replacements not available; automobiles have lain idle or fallen into disrepair; mining output has been on a much reduced scale. The only form of capital construction noted has been in the form of house building and slum clearance, partly undertaken as an offset to unemployment. In general, the lack of essential imports has caused a perceptible, but not irreparable deterioration. A certain amount of capital expenditure on the part of Germany will be required to bring mining output especially back to normal. To achieve substantial increases in African production, still further outlays of labor and resources would be called for; although in the important instance of phosphates, recently installed French Railway lines and mining equipment have significantly prepared the way for production increases. On the other hand, the transport at a steady rate of appreciable quantities of fuel oil would be essential; and the whole area is drastically short of manufactured goods of all kinds.

---

[5] For railroads, see especially State, Casablanca, August 9, 1941.

German occupation of North Africa, with or without the acquiescence of Weygand and Vichy, would certainly end the present flow of American goods to Morocco. Arrangements have been made to free blocked French funds in the United States to the maximum extent of roughly 48 million dollors per year.[6] A schedule of specific commodities and quantities has been drawn up representing the goods which may be exported under this arrangement. They include petroleum products and manufactured goods badly needed in the area. Before the goods may be exported, export licenses must be obtained from the United States and navicerts from Britain; and the goods must be carried in French vessels. It seems unlikely that purchases to the full potential amount will occur in the course of the coming year.[7] If schedules were, however, to be filled, American shipments would represent a substantial support to the Moroccan economy since total imports into French Morocco from all countries in the pre-war year 1938 were only about 61 million dollars.

---

[6] This information from Treasury, Division of Foreign Funds Control.

German entry would involve, to some extent, the necessity for filling the gap left by a cessation of American shipments; or a further deterioration in the North African economic position would have to be tolerated. The immediate military and long run economic advantages of occupation are so great that it is unlikely that the Germans would count this an important factor in their decision, except to the extent that Weygand's willingness to collaborate will be determined by the continuance or loss of American supplies. The American agreement is therefore to be judged not so much as an economic gain or loss to Germany, as one factor affecting the possible resistance to a German occupation.

---

[7] Shipments are now proceeding at about one quarter of the maximum rate; i.e., $3 million every three months. The agreement has, however, been in effect for too short a time (July 1, 1941) for any accurate judgment to be made.

The attached table constitutes an array of the more important commodities, agricultural and mineral, produced in North Africa. The strategic items among them are discussed at greater length below.

a.) Olive oil[8]

Olive oil production in North Africa is small relatively to that in Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Output in Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco is estimated at only 9% of the total in the Mediterranean

---

[8] In the pre-war years, Germany imported 22,600,000 bushels of oilseeds; 42,300 bushels of oilcakes. What is not Greater Germany is still more deficient; the corresponding figures are 26,800,000 bushels and 45,000,000 bushels. In the present German-dominated area (including all of France, but not Russia), there is a deficit of 23,500,000 bushels of oilseeds, and 75,400,000 bushels of oilcakes.

Germany's nutritional deficiencies are largest with respect to fats and oils. Supplies are low enough so that the rations for ordinary consumers are below the calculated level of nutritional adequacy. The amounts, however, available in one form or another for this year do not appear to jeopardize the current consumption level. Similarly, the livestock and dairy industries in Germany proper can make shift at the present level of output, although the insufficiency of carbohydrate and protein feed in Germany contributes to a reduction in quality.

For Greater Germany and for the dominated lands, however, there is a serious net deficiency of protein feeds. Significant imports must be maintained even to supply dairy, poultry and livestock products for the Continent. It is apparent, therefore, that additional sources of oils, oilseed and oilcakes would be desired by the Germans.

NORTH AFRICA*

Agricultural Products

COMMODITY	AREA OF PRODUCTION	NORMAL PRODUCTION	NORMAL EXPORT	CURRENT INFORMATION
WHEAT	1. French Morocco 2. Algeria 3. Tunisia	86,335,000 bu. (1939)	Approx. 10,645,900 bu. (1938-9)	
BARLEY	1. French Morocco 2. Algeria 3. Tunisia	78,254,000 bu. (1937-8)	6,252,000 bu. (1937-8)	
OATS	1. Algeria 2. French Morocco 3. Tunisia	15,977,000 bu. (1937-8)	616,000 bu. (1937-8)	All grain harvests expected to be abundant in 1941.
RYE	1. Algeria	44,000 bu. (1939)	64,000 bu. (1937)	
MAIZE	1. French Morocco 2. Tunisia 3. Algeria	7,401,000 bu. (1938)	1,333,000 bu. (1938)	Pressure from Continent for export reduces local stocks
OLIVE OIL	1. Tunisia 2. French Morocco 3. Algeria	84.1 thousand short tons (1929-37) 57.8 thousand short tons (est. 1941)	62.1 thousand short tons (1929-37)	Tunisian exportable surplus expected to be abnormally low in 1941; and for other areas as well. Used domestically as tractor lubricant.
WOOL	1. Algeria 2. French Morocco 3. Tunisia		29,373,000 lbs. (1938-9)	French Commission reported purchasing entire current output, probably for Germany.
TOBACCO	1. Algeria 2. Tunisia	43,937,000 lbs. (1939)		
WINES	1. Algeria 2. Tunisia 3. French Morocco		13,997,000 hectoliters, (av. 1934-38)	Excess on hand in Algeria
CITRUS FRUITS	1. Algeria	1,000,000 Quintals (est. 1941)	700,000 Quintals (av. 1934-38)	
CORK	1. French Morocco 2. Algeria 3. Tunisia	57,000 tons (av. normal) 35,000 tons (1940)		Some surplus offered for non-European export. Large stocks on hand. German purchases for lifebelts.

*Minerals***

COMMODITY	AREA OF PRODUCTION	NORMAL PRODUCTION	% OF WORLD PRODUCTION	CURRENT INFORMATION
PHOSPHATES	1. Tunisia 2. French Morocco 3. Algeria	3,875,954 M.T. (1938-9)	30%	Current output much reduced: Minor shipments to Spain and Italy.
IRON ORE	1. Algeria 2. Spanish Morocco 3. French Morocco	4,179,711 M.T. (1938-9)	2.1%	
COBALT	1. French Morocco	720 M.T.*** (1938)	27%	L'Omnium Nord Africain reported to have offered secretly to export substantial amounts to U.S. Germany reported forbidding such exports of Cobalt & Manganese. Manganese poor quality, now going largely to Italy.
MANGANESE	1. French Morocco 2. Spanish Morocco	86,749 M.T. (1938)	1.5%	
ANTIMONY	1. Algeria 2. French Morocco 3. Spanish Morocco	962 M.T. (1938)	2.1%	
MERCURY	1. Algeria 2. Tunis	15.9 M.T. (1938)	2%	
ZINC	1. Algeria 2. French Morocco	9,500 M.T. (1938-9)	.35%	
MOLYBDENUM	1. French Morocco	258 M.T. (1938)	1.3%	Germany reported to have forbidden export to U.S. of Molybdenum.
GRAPHITE	1. French Morocco	406 M.T. (1938)	.2%	
NICKEL	1. French Morocco	148 M.T. (1938)	.2%	
GOLD	1. French Morocco	46 Kg. (1936)		
SILVER	1. Algeria 2. Tunisia 3. French Morocco	2,877 Kg. (1936)	.05%	
TUNGSTEN	1. French Morocco	7 M.T. (1938)		
TIN	1. French Morocco	27 M.T. (1938)		
LEAD	1. French Morocco	27,000 M.T. (1938)	1%	
COPPER	1. Algeria	22 M.T. (1938)		
SULFUR	1. Algeria	19,430 M.T. (1938)		
PETROLEUM	1. Algeria 2. French Morocco	Evidences	none	

---

*Statistical Sources:

Friedensburg, B, Die Bergwirtschaft der Erde, Stuttgart, 1938.
International Review of Agriculture, published by International Institute of Agriculture, Rome. Latest edition, July-August 1941.
International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics, Rome, 1934.
The New International Yearbook, ed. Charles E. Funk, New York, 1941.

**In all important cases virtually the total mineral output is available for export.

***U. S. Bureau of Mines estimates.

area.[9] The normal exportable surplus from French North Africa is, however, over 40% of the export surplus for the whole area. In view of the shortage of vegetable oils on the continent, North African olive oil resources emerge as important. There would appear to have been no serious difficulties in transporting olive oil to the Continent. In the summer of 1941 stocks were reported abnormally low. Prospects for the 1941-42 harvest yield are regarded as only slightly below peacetime normal; although the exportable surplus may be less than expected, due to seepage into private hoards and the black bourses, which are at present tolerated.

b.) Wheat

French North Africa has exported some 12 million bushels of wheat each year since 1937. The 1932-37 average exports were between 17 and 18 million bushels. The reduction reflects, in part, weather conditions to which the North African crop is particularly subject. It also reflects the world wheat situation of the past years, coupled with the fact that French control has tended to direct the agriculture of its possessions to complement its own. This has meant a repressive policy towards North African wheat, since France has been on a net export basis for wheat in recent years. The wheat economy of this area has demonstrated considerable flexibility over the past years. It has expanded rapidly since the World War, while permitting short-time adjustments downwards. Similarly, the natives have made adjustments in types of wheat, producing durum, hard, and soft types in their effort best to supply the French and other markets. The present grain shortage in unoccupied France has made for an expansion of acreage and output.

---

[9] Projects Section, Planning Division, Office of the Administrator of Export Control, "Supplemental Report on the Preclusive Purchase of Vegetable Oils in French Africa". September 18, 1941, pp 4-6.

In general, North African wheat exports amounted to about one quarter of the imports of pre-Nazi Germany (1927-32). In the next five years, exports from this area (17.7 million bushels) almost equalled imports into the old Reich (18.5 million bushels). Though the present situation in Greater Germany would place less emphasis on wheat and grain requirements than upon other foods, Germany could use these supplies to advantage, particularly in view of the serious wheat deficiencies in the German-dominated lands. It is also noteworthy that normal net exports from North Africa added to normal net exports from the Danubian basin make the present German-controlled areas of Europe (excluding Russia) virtually self-sufficient with respect to wheat, if pre-war production levels are maintained. Current reports on the North African grain crop agree unanimously that 1941 yields will be abnormally large, despite shortages of fuel for mechanized agricultural equipment and binding twine for the sheaves.

c) Phosphates[10]

---

[10] (Footnote continued on next page) Phosphates for fertilizer are obtained from raw phosphate rock and from phosphate slag, a by-product of steel production. The latter source is large in Germany, which has ores of high phosphorous content. Fully 350,000 tons of P_2O_5, phosphate plant food, is provided annually by the steel industry. On the other hand, no domestic phosphate rock is available, so that it has been necessary for Germany to import the rest of her requirements, which amount today to at least 350,000 additional tons of P_2O_5. To produce this amount imports of about one million tons of high grade phosphate rock are necessary.

Principal sources have been the United States and French North Africa, which together provided 90 per cent of these imports, the remainder coming from Russia. Incidentally, total Russian pre-war exports of phosphate rock were less than half a million tons. Germany could

There is evidence that the Germans, as time goes on, will feel increasingly the shortage of phosphates. Even before the outbreak of war the soil of Germany appeared somewhat impoverished in this respect.[11] The phosphate slag yielded by the steel industry is inadequate; and the normal raw

---

[10] (Footnote continued from preceding page) now draw her requirements from Russia only at great cost to the Russian agricultural economy and with considerable transportation difficulties. The North African supplies are therefore her most likely supplementary source.

This area appeared to have as much as 3 million tons of raw phosphate rock available for export annually in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war. Much more could be obtained if the machinery and transport facilities only recently installed by the French were put to full use. And this volume of rock might yield close to one million tons of P_2O_5.

Phosphoric acid is of great importance to German agriculture in normal times. It is of vital importance in this war period, when a shift in production toward root crops and oilseeds is taking place. These crops generally require from 2 to 3 times as much phosphoric acid per acre as do the grains they are to replace.

There is some evidence that German soils have been deficient in phosphates since the World War. Allotments for use in 1940-41 were said to be only 40 per cent of those in 1937-38. Recent applications were evidently made from phosphate slag, and from small shipments of rock from Russia, and perhaps from Africa by way of Italy and France. German experiments, made over a period of years, indicate that a 60 per cent reduction in phosphoric acid fertilizer results in reductions in yield of about 10 per cent. There is also a quality deterioration, particularly in the protein content of green feed grown, which will adversely affect the nutrient content of the foodstuffs now so important to German wartime agriculture.

[11] Strauss, F., "The Food Problem in the German War Economy", Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1941, pp. 382-86.

material sources (United States, North Africa, and Russia) are now more or less out of reach. Some phosphates appear to be reaching Germany by rail from Italy and France, after shipment across the Mediterranean. It is doubtful, however, if anything like the normal full supply from North Africa is coming through. Production, after June 1940, is reported to have fallen to about half the pre-war rate.[12] Any freeing of transport across the Mediterranean would thus be of very considerable aid to German Agricultural production. Given adequate transport facilities North African phosphate rock is capable of filling what is calculated to be the major fertilizer shortage in German, and perhaps in the whole of Continental agriculture.

d) Cobalt

North African cobalt is obviously of

---

[12] An American consular report (State, Casablanca, January 24, 1941) contains the following revealing statistics: 3/4 of the 1939 export of phosphates from Morocco was 1,091,350 tons; exports for the first nine months of 1940 were 655,483 tons. A telegram, State, Algiers, January 14, 1941 reports phosphate output in Algeria down to 20,000 tons per month (normal 45,000), recently resumed after a period of stoppage. Only foreign shipments since June 1940 reported to be to Spain.

strategic importance to the German economy.[13] The other major producing areas, Burma, Bolivia, Northern Rhodesia, are outside German control. Cobalt itself has many important industrial uses, especially as a catalyst in the refinement of high octane gasoline and in the manufacture of high-grade steel, tools for metal cutting, magnetic steels, and rustless alloys. The North African cobalt supply (25-30% of total), therefore, rates high on a priorties list, although Moroccan production does not supply the full Continental need. Germany is reported to have forbidden the export of cobalt to the United States, although L'Omnium Nord Africain secretly offered to ship 600 to 700 tons monthly.

e) Other Commodities

Among the other commodities listed cork, wines, antimony, manganese, and molybdenum are especially to be noted. There is, apparently, no great German demand for North

---

[13] A recent (October 1941) American report states: "The Moroccan deposits are considered by the Germans as of exceptional quality. A (to us) friendly firm has succeeded in subtracting 3,000 tons of ore to date from deliveries that should have gone to Germany which are hidden near Casablanca. The Germans use the cobalt not only in the manufacture of Alnico metal, but chiefly as a catalyst to increase the degree octane of Roumanian gas, otherwise too poor for aviation motors."

African cork,[14] since output has been permitted to fall off and supplies to accumulate. An adequate flow may be available from the Iberian peninsula; and the additional quantity to be drawn from North Africa may not justify the shipping space required to transport it. North African wines have long been an important French staple. They are mixed with the lighter French wines; and sometimes serve by themselves as a cheap table wine. The extent to which shipping has been allocated for its transport is not fully known, although fully 65,000 tons - the largest single item by weight - came to Marseille from North Africa in a recent six weeks period. Antimony and molybdenum, although present in relatively small quantities, are being sent to the Continent, where they are badly needed in armament production. The latter is especially important since the Germans are short of tungsten for the hardening of steel.

---

[14] Recent reports, State, Casablanca, February 19, 1941; State, Algiers, May 17, 1941, state that Germany has been negotiation indirectly for the purchase of cork for 1,500,000 life preservers, allegedly for use in an invasion of Britain.

Molybdenum is the best existing substitute for tungsten.[15] There are reports of shipments of North African manganese to Italy; and there is evidence that unused stocks are available. In general, North African manganese ore is low grade (less than 30 per cent manganese content), and would not be used, for example, by American manufacturers. They may be viewed as more useful on the Continent, especially since the important Russian supply is now denied.

Conclusion: Germany and the rest of the European Continent are at present drawing considerable economic benefits from North Africa. Grains, wines, olive oil, and other foodstuffs are helping somewhat to relieve the pressure on unoccupied France, and on Germany as well. The phosphates, cobalt, manganese, antimony, and molybdenum are also available in amounts not far below normal; although in this respect phosphate rock may be an exception. Unless further shipping protection and facilities be made available to the Mediterranean routes; and unless considerable amounts of labor and resources be expended in regenerating and improving the capital facilities of the area, it is doubtful if a substantial increase in the flow of goods from North Africa to the Continent can be achieved. And in general, the short run success of attempts to exploit new mineral resources is problematical.

---

[15] A recent (February 28, 1941) German article, "Europe's Metal Basis", Der Wirtschaftsring, states that current molybdenum supplies from Morocco are of low grade, but that rich supplies may be available, after search, in the Atlas Mountains.

2. West Africa

As in the case of North Africa, the immediate economic advantages to be derived by the Germans from control of West Africa hinge on military considerations. The first such consideration involves estimating the extent to which non-French West African territories would come into German hands if Dakar and Senegal were occupied. The resources of Gambia, Portuguese Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Gold Coast, and even Nigeria - now more or less available to the British - might, under certain circumstances, be denied. In addition, Free French Equatorial Africa would be endangered. The acquisition of these territories would, of course, involve very considerable military expeditions; and they would probably necessitate active cooperation on the part of the Vichy-French naval and land forces.

It is more likely that, in the first instance, a German penetration of West Africa would center about Dakar. Aside from the obvious advantages of Dakar as a submarine and naval base, the net gain would then depend upon consequent improvements in transport facilities to North Africa. With respect to the sea routes the action taken by the French navy would be crucial. With its support the coastal route, from Dakar to Casablanca, might, with air assistance, be fairly well protected. Without strong naval forces, however, there might be, in the short run, an actual slackening of the flow of supplies from France to North Africa by sea. British naval activity in those waters would, almost certainly, increase. But perhaps the first action taken by the Germans, if they were to occupy North Africa, would be to extend and complete the projected road and railroad from Morocco to Senegal. Even if the full force of their energy and ingenuity were mobilized on this project, it is doubtful if overland transport would be available to them within a short period of time. One therefore cannot count among the short run economic gains to Germany the exportable surpluses of Senegal and Dakar, unless the co-operation of the French Navy were attained. In that case, unless strong preventive action were taken, British Gambia, completely surrounded by Senegal, would probably fall.

Britain at present is drawing no supplies from French North and West Africa.[16] The shipments from North Africa to the United States have been and probably will be nominal. The immediate economic loss that the Germans are capable of inflicting on the Allies stems therefore from two conditions: first, of course, the South Atlantic shipping routes would be further disrupted; second, an area South and East of Dakar would be threatened or occupied, depending on the action taken by Germany, and the effectiveness of Allied counter moves. Specifically, the following areas might be affected: British Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Gold Coast,

---

[16] The importance of British possessions in West Africa to the British economy is clear from the accompanying table. It is especially to be noted that for the year 1941-42 almost half of British vegetable oil imports are expected to come from Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, and Sudan.

Nigeria, and Equatorial Africa (Free French). The bases at Bathurst and Freetown are clearly the greatest British stake in this area. Economically the vegetable oils of Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, and the diamonds, manganese, and tin of the Gold Coast constitute a considerable potential loss.

The attached table lists the more important products now yielded by British and French West Africa.

The largest single economic gain that might accrue to Germany from control of West Africa, and a consequent improvement of transport facilities, would be in the form of vegetable oils. This now serves not only as an essential foodstuff, but also as a lubricant in submarine and other Diesel engines. This commodity is much needed on the continent, where there is estimated to be available for consumption only 58% of minimum vegetable oil needs.[17] All of Vichy-controlled Africa is believed capable of supplying

---

[17] Projects Section, Planning Division, Office of the Administrator of Export Control, "Supplemental Report on the Preclusive Purchase of Vegetable Oils in French Africa", September 18, 1941, p. 1, n.

WEST AFRICA
(French and British)

Agricultural Products

COMMODITY	AREA OF PRODUCTION	NORMAL PRODUCTION	NORMAL EXPORT	CURRENT INFORMATION
PEANUTS	1. Senegal 2. Sudan 3. Nigeria 4. Ivory Coast	1940 - 540,000 T 1936 - 589,000 T	1936 - 589,000 T.	1941 Crop expected to be seriously deficient. Large current stocks at Dakar.
PALM OIL and NUTS	1. Dahomey 2. Guinea 3. Ivory Coast	132,000 T (annual average)	110,000 T (annual average)	No current stocks noted at Dahomey
COCOA BEANS	1. Ivory Coast (99.97%)	1938 - 58,150 T	1938 - 58,150 T	
COFFEE	1. Ivory Coast 2. Guinea	1939 - 16,500 T 1941 - 22,000 T est.	1939 - 16,500 T	
SHEA PRODUCTS (Karite)	1. Ivory Coast 2. Dahomey 3. Sudan		1937 - 17,572 T	
BANANAS	1. Guinea 2. Ivory Coast		1938 - 71,798 T	
SISAL	1. Senegal - Sudan 2/3/of total		1938 - 44,940 T	
COTTON	1. Senegal - Sudan 2. Ivory Coast 3. Nigeria	Import requirements far exceed exports	1938 - 5,299 T	

*Minerals**

COMMODITY	AREA OF PRODUCTION	NORMAL PRODUCTION	% OF WORLD PRODUCTION
DIAMONDS	1. Gold Coast 2. Sierra Leone 3. French West Africa	1936 - 2,106,000 Carats	25.0%
MANGANESE	1. Gold Coast	1936 - 447,000 M.T.	8.0%
TIN	1. Nigeria	1936 - 9,200 M.T.	5.0%
GOLD	1. Gold Coast 2. Sierra Leone	1936 - 14,490 Kg.	1.3%
SILVER	1. Nigeria 2. Gold Coast	1936 - 5,185 Kg.	.1%
PLATINUM	1. Nigeria	1936 - 15 M.T.	---
TUNGSTEN	1. Nigeria	1936 - 6 M.T.	---
IRON ORE	1. Sierra Leone	1936 - 585,000 M.T.	.3%
LEAD	1. Nigeria	1936 - 843 M.T.	---

---

*With unimportant exceptions all mineral resources in West Africa, now producing appreciable supplies, are in British hands.

an additional 32% of total minimum continental needs, of which more than half would be peanut oil.

How much is, at present, getting through from West Africa is difficult to estimate. One estimate is that 25% of current output is getting to Germany. It is known that the lack of transport facilities has led to a piling up of stocks. Fully 700,000 tons are known to have accumulated in Dakar warehouses. New peanut presses have been installed at Dakar, and the oil used to fuel vessels there. About half of the 1940 commercial peanut crop is believed to have been moved successfully to North Africa and France. In a six weeks period 30,000 tons of peanuts arrived in Marseille, in the summer of 1941. The outlook for the 1941 Senegal crop is poor due to the drought in that area.

The blockade of West Africa has not been complete, and it has been the shortage of vessels which has, essentially, limited the flow of vegetable oils to the North. The potentialities of airplane transport of vegetable oils are limited, and the caravan route is slow and inadequate. If German action in West Africa involved a tightening of British controls along the coast, the flow might be even less than under present conditions. If British control of Bathurst and Freetown were maintained, supplies of palm oil, coming from French territories south and east of Dakar, might, in addition, be sacrificed. These amount to roughly 75 thousand tons annually, or 25% of the total vegetable oil produce of Vichy-controlled.Africa.

Conclusion: At the present time the Continental economy is getting from French West Africa appreciable amounts of peanut and palm oil. These are the only strategic commodities to be drawn, in significant volume, from French territory in that region. The present flow is sub-normal as compared to peace time exports. This is due to the shortage of French and Axis shipping, and to the British policy of occasionally taking prizes on the Dakar-Casablanca route. Air and land transport have not succeeded in significantly reducing the shipping gap. Air and perhaps sea protection on a considerable scale would be necessary to bring West African exports back to normal, if the British were to attempt more systematically to disrupt the sea route. This they would almost certainly do upon German occupation of North or West Africa.

The more productive colonies, with respect to minerals and palm oil, lie south and east of Dakar. If the Germans were able, after same time, to make West Africa a significant base for land and air forces, it might be possible for them to move down the coast, getting to the diamonds, manganese, gold, and vegetable oils that are to be found between Senegal and Nigeria. They could, moreover, threaten Freetown and probably capture Bathurst, an isolated station. In the short run, however, the Germans would have to assume a net economic loss in that area.

SECRET

THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF A GERMAN CONQUEST OF NORTHWEST AFRICA

Mediterranean Section

SECRET

THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF A GERMAN CONQUEST OF NORTHWEST AFRICA

Summary and Conclusion

A. Probable German Disposition.

Assuming Spanish collaboration and full resistance by the French in North Africa the Germans would be able to execute their campaign with nine to fourteen divisions and sufficient planes for air superiority. This force would be sufficient considering the probable support of ten Spanish and possibly some Italian infantry divisions as well as the support of Italian and Spanish air and naval craft.

B. The transit of Spain would offer few difficulties. The major difficulty would be the provision of food, gasoline, and war materiel for the advancing forces.

C. The crossing of the Mediterranean presents the most difficult operation of the entire campaign. The Axis air force aided by Italian and Spanish naval units is expected to neutralize the British naval forces as well as Gibraltar and Malta. The problem of the supply of tonnage is negligible.

D. The German campaign in French North Africa can hardly be considered a difficult campaign in view of the small military effectiveness of the French army and air force. Fifth column action among the nationals of Axis powers as well as French citizens and natives is liable to make the task even easier.

E. Conclusion: Barring outside aid little resistance can be offered to the extension of German power to North Africa.

SECRET

THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF A GERMAN CONQUEST OF NORTHWEST AFRICA

A. Probable German Dispositions.

The military effort of the Germans in their occupation of Northwest Africa will vary with the degree of resistance their army will encounter from France, Spain, Portugal and the North African colonies of these powers. It is improbable that unless the military situation in Europe changes greatly the Germans will have to face the combined strength of all of these countries, and even in that case the lack of modern equipment and factors of geography make their opposition less formidable than their numerical strength would indicate.

The military, naval, and air strength in the Western Mediterranean is at the present time about the following:

1) Spain

a) Army - 500,000 to 550,000.

These troops are reported to be badly equipped, fed, clothed and disciplined. Their armament and training do not fit them for modern mechanized combat.[1]

b) Navy - 6 cruisers
18 destroyers
5 submarines

---

[1] Naval Attaché, Lisbon, December 31, 1940; idem., September 17, 1941; Military Attaché, Tangier, June 22, 1941.

Four of the cruisers launched between 1925 and 1931 have the speed and gun power to be very useful.[2]

c) Air force: 400 first-line planes.[3]

2) Portugal

a) Army: 50,000

The size, equipment and training of the Portuguese Army preclude any offensive strategy. It is estimated that a German invasion could be executed in two or three days.[4] The best troops and equipment are reported to have been moved to the Azores.[5]

b) Navy: 3 light cruisers
10 destroyers
3 submarines
7 smaller vessels[6]

c) Air force: About 150 planes.[7]

---

[2] Jane's Fighting Ships, 1940; Brassey's Naval Annual, 1941. The Naval Attaché Madrid, October 6, 1941 reports only 13 destroyers in his distribution report of October 1, 1941.

[3] MID. Evaluation report, September 5, 1941.

[4] War Dept., Survey of Portugal, September 9, 1941.

[5] ONI, Memorandum on Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941.

[6] War Dept., Survey of Portugal, September 9, 1941. The Naval Attaché, Lisbon, October 10, 1941 reports the following: 7 sloops, 6 destroyers, 3 submarines, 10 gunboats, 9 auxiliary vessels.

[7] MID, Evaluation Report, September 5, 1941. The Naval Attaché, Lisbon, July 28, 1941 listed the Portuguese air strength at 156 planes: Army - 60 (Bombers 18, Fighters 12, Observation 30); Navy - 24 (Bombers 6, Observation 18); Others: 72 (Trainers etc.)

3) France

a) Army

Vichy - 86,000
North Africa - 80,000
West Africa - 50,000 to 70,000

The North African troops have full equipment in small arms, machine guns, and light artillery, but no mechanized equipment, practically no anti-tank guns, and very limited anti-aircraft materiel. The supply of munitions is estimated to be sufficient for ten days' operations of the entire force.[8]

b) Navy (Effectives under Vichy command in European and Northwest African waters)

2 battleships
1 aircraft carrier
4 heavy cruisers
7 light cruisers
25 flotilla leaders
28 destroyers
55 submarines[9]

At Toulon the bulk of the fleet is stationed: The battleships Strasbourg and Provence, the latter classified as an old battleship, the aircraft carrier Commandant Teste, four heavy cruisers three light cruisers, eighteen flotilla leaders, seventeen destroyers, twenty-five submarines. These units are in good condition, with the exception of two flotilla leaders now under repair. Oil and ammunition stocks are very low, however, sufficient for only one complete outfit.[10]

---

[8] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; British report, The Possibilities of Action in French North Africa, undated (to be quoted in subsequent pages as Accession 2466); State, Algiers, April 21, 1941.

[9] ONI, Status of French Fleet, October 1, 1941. The same source is used for the distribution of the fleet.

At Oran--Mers-el-Kebir (which has supplanted Bizerta as the principal French naval center), a smaller fraction of the fleet is stationed: the battleship Dunkerque, two flotilla leaders, four destroyers, ten submarines. The Dunkerque is still undergoing repairs; the starboard hole has been sheathed with steel plates and cement. Estimates of her possible speed range from twelve to twenty-five knots.[11]

At Casablanca are the battleship Jean Bart, two light cruisers, one flotilla leader, six destroyers, eight submarines. The Jean Bart is not in condition to put to sea for operations. It is being used as a school ship, with the heavy stern battery not installed and the secondary one not complete.[12]

---

[10] Accession 2466.

[11] State, Tangier, November 3, 1941; MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941 (Report as of August 2, 1941); ONI, Vichy, Aug. 25, 1941; State, Algeria, July 6, 1941.

[12] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, Aug. 15, 1941; State, Casablanca, Mar. 20, June 16, 1941; Military Attaché, Tangier, July 22, 1941; Telegram, State, Casablanca, October 15, 1941.

c) Air Force estimated at 847[13]

	Total	Bombers	Fighters	Observation	Sea Planes
Vichy	312	86	164	39	23
Morocco	140	77	50	13	
Algeria	138	60	50	28	
Tunisia	93	13	32	15	33
West Africa	164	100	40		24

The efficiency of this force would be fairly high at the outset, but would depreciate rapidly after the first few weeks owing to the lack of spares.[14] Other qualified observers do not grant "fairly high efficiency" even at the outset.

4) Great Britain

The British naval, land, and air forces based on Gibraltar and Malta will certainly offer serious resistance.[15]

---

[13] This report, forwarded by the Naval Attaché, Madrid, September 9, 1941, is rated "B", but it is used by the British in Accession 2446. The MID Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941, reports 435, instead of 371, planes for North Africa and a different distribution. (The forty Tunisian planes lost in Syria have been replaced, with permission of the Armistice Commission. State, Casablanca, July 9, 1941.)

[14] Accession 2466.

[15] For detailed information see MID, Evaluation Report, September 5, 1941.

The Spanish and Portuguese metropolitan forces are expected by most observers to offer no resistance to the Germans.[16] In fact the present disposition of Spanish forces in Southern Spain and Spanish Morocco indicates that the Spanish Army may be preparing for action in North Africa. Certainly it is not preparing for action at the Pyrenees.[17] Such a conclusion is reenforced by the reports on the military activity in Spanish Morocco: the building of roads, the stocking of supplies of food and munitions.[18] Consequently the Spanish colonial force must be counted a most probable net addition to the German strength.

The attitude of France will determine whether the cost of military occupation of Northwest Africa will consist of a mere diversion of occupying forces or on the other hand, a military campaign. In case both Vichy and the Northwest African administration gave full collaboration, occupation could be undertaken immediately, without the violation or even the cooperation of Spain. Considering, however, the present strategic situation in Europe and assuming no great changes during the winter of 1941 to 1942, Germany must mobilize its forces in the expectation of full (or at least partial) resistance in French North Africa.[19]

---

[16] See the supporting study, The German Political and Economic Problem in Iberia.

[17] On Dec. 31, 1940 the Naval Attaché at Lisbon reported the disposition of the Spanish Army as follows: Morocco, 150,000; Southern Spain, 100,000; Canary Islands, 10,000; Portuguese frontier, 80,000; Balearic 15,000; Elsewhere, 175,000. Since that time the garrisons in Northern Spain have been weakened to increase the troop concentrations in Morocco to 194,000. (State, Tangier, Aug. 23, 1941) and in the Canaries to 55,000 (MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, Aug. 15, 1941; ONI, Memorandum on Northwest Africa, Aug. 15, 1941). See also Naval Attaché, Lisbon, Sept. 17, 1941 on the disposition of Spanish troops.

[18] Naval Attaché, Madrid, September 25, 1941, quoting the U. S. Legation, Tangier.

On the assumption of Spanish collaboration and French North African resistance, it is calculated that the conquest of French Northwest Africa will require not less than nine German divisions. This drive will take the form of a pincer movement through Tunisia and through Spain.[20] The Spanish pincer would consist of four to eight divisions to be reenforced by the one hundred ninety-four thousand Spanish troops garrisoned in Morocco[21] and the German tourists and technical experts reported to be on Spanish soil. The Tunisian pincer would need five to six German divisions, possibly reenforced by some Italian infantry.[22] Guesses at the number of German planes needed for this campaign vary from one thousand to two thousand to be about equally divided between the two arms of the pincer.[23]

---

[19] See the supporting study: The Problem of Vichy.

[20] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941, includes a study by a member of General Weygand's staff, dated May 1941; Accession 2466, British report on The Possibilities of Action in French North Africa.

[21] The French report estimated the German force at three armored, three motorized, and two infantry divisions; the British calculated one armored, two motorized, and one air-borne infantry divisions. In case of resistance by Spain the German force would have to consist of fourteen divisions, according to the British.

To judge the length of time such an operation would take is a most hazardous task. Existing estimates vary widely because of different assumptions, unknown to the writer. Suffice it to say that the French consider thirty days sufficient for the entire campaign from the Pyrenees to the conquest of Northwest Africa, while the British estimate forty-two days for the concentration of the German troops on the Spanish-French Moroccan border.[24]

Consequently, according to military estimates, the occupation of French Northwest Africa by the Germans will require no major campaign. Its success depends largely on the availability of a comparatively small amount of mechanized war materiel and airplanes plus its trained personnel.

---

[22] The French predict that the Germans will launch two armored and two mechanized divisions from Tripolitania, and one armored and one motorized divisions from Southern Italy to be reenforced by ten Italian infantry divisions. The British believe that a sea and air landing of one armored, two motorized, and two infantry divisions by the Germans would suffice.

[23] The French estimate of the probable German air force is from one thousand to sixteen hundred planes. The British believe that seven hundred fifty planes would be needed by the Spanish wing, and eight hundred forty by the Tunisian force plus five hundred troop carrying planes and possibly four hundred fifty Italian planes.

[24] French estimate in MID Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; the British estimate in Accession 2466.

B. The German Transit Through Spain.

The transit of German troops through a Spain collaborating with Germany should not prove too difficult. The Spanish road system, though it has deteriorated, is in fairly good condition. The geographical difficulties of building railroads in Spain made the Spaniards concentrate on highway construction. Motor transport, however, is handicapped by the scarcity of oil, gasoline, tires, and motor parts, which an invading force would have to supply itself.[25] Also, many of the bridges and trestles, now limited to ten tons, will have to be strengthened.[26]

The Spanish railroad system should prove adequate for no more than an auxiliary supply line. In recent times Spanish railroads have been reported as seriously disorganized (forty per cent efficient).[27] The shortage of rolling stock, the scarcity of coal and lubricants, have made even food distribution in Spain difficult.[28] Moreover, the French railroad gauge (4' 8½") does not match the Spanish one (5' 6"), but a possible bottleneck in supplies at the frontier has been partially removed by the building of a new railroad bridge at Irun-Hendaye[29] and the extension of the Spanish gauge into France[30].

---

[25] On existing shortages in Spain see the supporting study The German Political and Economic Problem in Iberia.

[26] Some work, but not intensive, is being carried on (Naval Attaché, Lisbon, August 7, 1941). The Military Attaché in London reported on September 9, 1941 that the preparations in Northern Spain were completed.

[27] U. S. Embassy, Madrid, October 13, 1941.

If the Germans will move from occupied France they will have at their disposal two railroads and four highways crossing the Pyrenees. In case they will obtain the use of the unoccupied French zone two more railroads and four more highways will become available.[31] In either case sufficient roads and railroads exist beyond the Spanish-French frontier to move German troops to the Straits of Gibraltar. Half of them could take the route to the Mediterranean ports of Valencia, Alicante, Cartagena, Almeria, and Malaga.[32] These ports were adequate for the embarkation of the Spanish expedition against the Riffs in 1925. The other half could proceed via Madrid to the ports of Seville and Cadiz which have large harbor facilities; could possibly even use the Southern

---

[28] See supporting study on The German Political and Economic Problem in Iberia.

[29] Naval Attaché, Madrid, July 12, August 7, 1941.

[30] Naval Attaché, Lisbon, December 31, 1940.

[31] Naval Attaché, Lisbon, December 31, 1940.

[32] Algeciras across from Gibraltar would naturally be unavailable.

Portuguese ports.[33]

For the transit and embarkation of four to eight divisions, most of them mechanized, the Spanish transportation system even in its present condition should prove adequate. The supply of food stuffs, spare parts, gasoline, and war materiel should not present an insurmountable problem to the Germans in the light of their Balkan and Russian experiences. Moreover, much of the essential materiel could be transported into collaborationist Spain before the actual campaign began. Already many rumors concerning German munition dumps and airfields in Southern Spain are current.[34] The British troops in Gibraltar could do nothing to challenge German occupation of Southern Spain. Only a national Spanish rising of great proportions could slow up the German progress to any perceptable degree.

C. The German Transit Across the Mediterranean

Once established in southern Spain and Italy, the Germans must face three problems: 1) gathering the tonnage necessary for the transit; 2) overcoming the resistance which British naval and air forces may offer to their transit (this the Germans would have to do by making Gibraltar and Malta untenable as naval and air bases); 3) reduction of resistance in Spanish Morocco if that area had already been occupied by an Allied force. Little can be said of the latter problem until more is known of Allied dispositions.

---

[33] On the general logistics, especially harbors, see British Admiralty Intelligence Report, Spain with Possessions, October, 1940.

[34] A German munition depot was said to exist at Belez (Malaga), (Military Attaché, Vichy, September 9, 1941). A radio transmitter at La Coruña (Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 4, 1941). NID, September 9, 1941 reported, however, that a thousand Germans left Spain during August.

The problem of tonnage for the transport of German troops across the Straits is not a serious one. According to military advice, two net registered tons per man suffice for the personnel of an army corps if the troops are to be sent overseas and kept in the field thirty days. Since the transit of the Mediterranean is a short voyage this tonnage allowance per man should suffice even for the heavy mechanized units contemplated. Available Axis tonnage in the Mediterranean is estimated at one million, seven hundred thirty-three thousand tons non-tanker ships and two hundred eighteen thousand tons of tankers as of June 1, 1941. This tonnage, certainly reduced by recent sinkings, nevertheless, in all probability, far exceeds the outside demands of a German expeditionary force.

Thus the problem of destroying the effectiveness of the British Western Mediterranean fleet is the most immediate problem which the Germans face. For the

British warships to function properly they must have ready access to and from their base in Gibraltar harbor, but German artillery, air, and submarine attack would make such access quickly impossible.[35]

The naval harbor of Gibraltar on the western side of the Rock is fully open to artillery fire from the Spanish mainland, which lies only four to five miles away. Powerful batteries are already installed in Algeciras and the hills beyond as well as in the Sierra Carbonera to the north.[36] These batteries hardly need the reenforcement of German mobile artillery to make the harbor untenable for the British fleet.

Moreover, even within the Straits the British fleet would be exposed to the fire of shore batteries, for Spanish fortifications on either side of the Straits are so placed as to control the sea communications within the

---

[35] The British themselves consider it untenable (Reported by the Assistant Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 12, 1941; MID report from Tangier, Bentley, July 7, 1941).

[36] British Admiralty Intelligence Report, October 1940; Naval Attaché, Madrid, October 6, 1941; note also that "the only new railway construction of importance in Spain going on in the second quarter of 1941 was the Bobadilla-Algeciras section of the National Railway System, for military reasons." (State, Madrid Embassy, Summary of Economic and Commercial Conditions, July 2, 1941).

Straits.[37]

Air attack represents an even greater danger to the Gibraltar naval base. The compaigns of Norway and Crete have demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of ships to land-based aircraft. With twenty Spanish airdromes available within effective striking distance of Gibraltar the Germans could keep Gibraltar under incessant fire,[38] especially with the airdrome of Los Barrios close by but out of gunshot range of the Rock and that of Tetuan (in Spanish Morocco) forty miles distant.[39]

Existing Allied air defenses against such German air power are hopelessly inadequate. The small exposed airdrome at Gibraltar would in all probability be quickly rendered useless by artillery and air attack. The small number of planes from the British aircraft carrier at Gibraltar would probably be ineffective against land-based fighters.[40] French airdromes in Morocco might furnish bases for defending planes, but the existing shortage of gasoline, spare parts, and munitions would cut down their usefulness in a few days.[41] Allied air squadrons would have to be furnished with most of their supplies from overseas.

---

[37] "These forts, plus aircraft operating from airfields now ready which border on the Straits, together with a few submarines, would render entrance and egress to the Mediterranean, of belligerent vessels, practically impossible" (Naval Attaché, Lisbon, August 7, 1941). Also Naval Attaché, Madrid, June 1, July 1, 1941 on coast defenses between Tarifa and Punta Carnera, and Algeciras to Punta Secreta.

[38] Accession 2466. Naval Attaché, Madrid, Sept. 28, 1941.

[39] Garrett, G. T., Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, London, 1939, p. 304.

[40] The British NID report of June 23, 1941, also mentions the lack of air defense in depth to protect Gibraltar.

A further threat to British domination of the Straits might arise from German submarines operating from Spanish naval bases. Such submarines could make serious trouble for the British surface craft in the restricted waters of the Straits, which are too deep for mines.

With German artillery, air, and submarine attack making Gibraltar untenable as a naval base the British could do little more than put the German transit under hampering but not crucial submarine attacks. The fortress of Gibraltar could not prevent the passage of troop transports except within the range of its guns. The Germans, knowing the difficulties involved in taking it, would probably by-pass it for the time being.

In the central Mediterranean the British naval base at Malta could do as little to impede the eastern arm of the German pincer movement into North Africa as Gibraltar, the western. Bombed continuously from air bases in Southern Italy and Sicily, Malta is serving now only British submarines and occasional destroyers. Moreover, the fact that Malta's drydock has been damaged so that large ships cannot be repaired there is of academic importance only, for the hazard of immobilizing any ship in Malta for a length of time is too great a risk to run. Serious naval interference with German transit would have to be based on Alexandria, but the shortness of the transit from Sicily and Southern Italy to Tunis, the Axis freedom in choice of time, and probable Axis air superiority would make an effective British naval effort extremely difficult.

---

[41] Accession 2466.

Malta, however, is also an air base with excellent anti-aircraft protection and a heavy garrison. It would not be easy to capture. It is being used for raids against Southern Italy and the Axis supply lines to Libya. Bombers from Egypt refuel there. Air activity from Malta, especially heavy during the fall of 1941, has been increasingly effective, but estimates on the degree of effectiveness vary widely.[42]

---

[42] (Footnote continued on next page). One reliable source asserts that Axis shipping rarely uses the Sicily-Tripoli route which has become too precarious; that it uses instead a route running from the Adriatic ports to Tripoli and Bengazi. This source states that the British claim only one per cent destruction of shipping between July 1, 1941 and November 1, 1941 over this second route. A second source equally well-informed differs greatly. He feels that one per cent is too low a figure and argues that if this figure were correct, why does the Axis still use the shorter and more precarious Sicily-Tripoli route. When told that another source had averred that the Sicily-Tripoli route was not

Nevertheless, Malta could probably be neutralized if the Germans and Italians employ the estimated five hundred to eighteen hundred airplanes. As bases they will have available four good airdromes in Sardinia, seven in Sicily and ten in Southern Italy, besides twenty-two airdromes and landing grounds in Tripolitania. With these geographical advantages the Axis air force could probably defend the transit of German troops against any naval and air forces the British now have available.

In this action the Germans could count upon the support of some of their own naval units, possibly even upon the small Spanish fleet. Their main support, however, would have to be the Italian navy. At the present time the Italian fleet consists of the following effectives ready for action:[43]

---

[42] (continued from preceding page).
in wide use, he said he felt that this was incorrect--the Sicily-Tripoli route was in wide use. By way of possible confirmation of his view, there is the recent statement purportedly from Admiral Browne-Cunningham (New York Herald-Tribune, November 10, 1941) which asserts British destruction of thirty-five per cent to forty per cent of Axis tonnage crossing the Mediterranean. Another possible confirmation is the report that Italian submarines are said to be pressed into cargo service over this transit. (Naval Attache, Rome, September 16, 1941) If true this situation might argue the precariousness of the transit for surface vessels.

[43] ONI, Memorandum on the "Present Status of the Italian Fleet", October 1, 1941. A report of the Naval Attache, Rome, September 30, 1941 indicates 4 battleships and 2 heavy cruisers, 32 destroyers, 23 torpedo boats, and 81 submarines ready for action.

5 battleships (none in perfect condition)
3 heavy cruisers
10 light cruisers
56 destroyers (7 or 8 more near completion)
52 submarines

In general Italian naval strength has been cut to less than half its pre-war strength. New battleship construction (Roma, Impero) is proceeding slowly for lack of materials, and the Italians are concentrating their efforts on the construction of small tonnage ships, especially on about one hundred MAS boats.[44] The personnel shortage is especially acute for submarines, destroyers, and other light craft. A considerable number of submarines and surface craft are unable to operate for lack of fuel oil. The situation is so bad that only six or seven submarines of the forty-eight in the Mediterranean can operate at a time.[45] In spite of these shortcomings, however, the Italian fleet would prove a valueable adjunct to Axis air power in the crossing of the Mediterranean.

Considering the general insufficiency of the Spanish fleet in numbers and equipment, it would only be a small addition to Axis strength. However, Spain's principal naval bases at Cartagena, Cadiz, and Palma, as well as the submarine base at Denia in the Mediterranean, would be of great practical help to the Germans in a drive across the Straits.

---

[44] Naval Attaché, Rome, October 7, September 23, 1941.

[45] Naval Attaché, Rome, September 30, 1941, see also the reports of September 9, 16, 23, October 7, 1941.

In Spanish Morocco the Germans would have at their disposal the ports of Tangier, Ceuta, and Melilla, with a capacity to maintain ten to eleven divisions at operational scale.[46] In case the guns of Gibraltar would interfere with the use of Ceuta[47], the smaller harbors of Larache, Arzilla, Tetuan, Alhucemas, and Peñon de Velez de la Gomera besides a number of beaches are available for the landing of troops and light materiel. Moreover, the main and the smaller harbors are provided with shore batteries to protect the landing against naval forces.[48] Considering the short distance from the coast to the French frontier, the highway system of Spanish Morocco, though not in the best condition is certainly adequate.[49] The main German problem would consist of providing food, gasoline, oil, and tires, since the existing stocks are woefully inadequate.[50] This problem, however, could be solved beforehand, with the support of a collaborationist Spain.[51]

---

[46] Accession 2466.

[47] Accession 2466 states that Ceuta is too far away to be seriously interfered with by the guns of Gibraltar.

[48] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941. The formerly neutralized Tangier is now defended if not by concrete fortifications (Assistant Naval Attaché, Lisbon, September 4, 1941) certainly by mobile artillery (Naval Attaché, Madrid, September 25, 1941).

[49] Two roads are being constructed at the present time from Ceuta to Tangier (Assistant Naval Attaché, Lisbon, Sept. 4, 1941; MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941). Improvement work is being carried on on the main road from Tetuan to Melilla. (MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; includes also the account of a recent trip from Tetuan to Melilla).

Against this Axis strength the existing Allied forces in the Mediterranean are hopelessly inadequate. Barring a major Allied expedition only two possibilities to create serious difficulties for the Germans exist: 1) the air superiority of the Axis might be challenged by increasing Allied air strength at the French North African airdromes; 2) the transit of the Germans might be made extremely difficult by the full cooperation of the Vichy fleet with the British. The first possibility, however, is made impracticable by the surveillance of the German and Italian Armistice Commissions in North Africa and the second seems improbable considering the present attitude of Vichy, the superior officers of the French fleet, and the small stock of oil fuel and ammunition at Toulon and North Africa.

---

[50] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941, ISIS, Morocco, November 1940.

[51] Rumors of shipments of war material have been forwarded again and again: Assistant Naval Attache, September 12, 1941; ONI, Memorandum on Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; Military Attache, London, August 5, 1941; Military Attache, Tangier, September 9, 1941. The preparation of airfields, the establishment of gasoline dumps, and the accumulation of foodstuffs are reported by the U. S. Legation, Tangier, September 22, 1941. (Quoted by the Naval Attache, Madrid, September 25, 1941).

Consequently, the transit of German troops from Europe to Africa appears under present conditions to present no insurmountable difficulties.

D. The German Campaign in French Northwest Africa.

Their forces assembled in Spanish Morocco, Southern Italy and in Western Libya, the Germans could easily overcome the weak French forces now stationed in Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco.[52]

The food supply of the invading force will probably constitute the most serious problem in French North Africa, which has been stripped of its surplusses to provide food for metropolitan France.[53] By accumulating food stocks in Spanish Morocco, however, and slightly increasing transport tonnage these difficulties could be overcome. The anticipated shortness of the campaign makes the supply problem less acute.

The military resistance to the German drive is limited by the poor equipment of the French forces. The eighty thousand troops now in North Africa are insufficiently supplied with mechanized weapons, thus making impossible anything more than a delaying action. They are fully equipped only in small arms and machine guns. None of their artillery is heavier than 155 mm. They have practically no anti-tank guns and very little anti-aircraft materiel. The supply of munitions is expected to keep the entire force in the field no longer than ten days.[54] Though it is reported that the French forces could be enlarged to about two hundred thousand by mobilizing trained reserves,[55] the proper equipment of such a force is probably lacking.[56]

---

[52] The will of the French land, sea, and air forces to resist a German invasion will be determined to a large degree by the decisions of the North African leaders (See the supporting study The Problem of Vichy). It has been complicated, however, by the appointment of Generals Juin, Koeltz, and Delattre de Tassigny as C.O.'s in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia respectively (NID, Situation Report, August 28, 1941). Recent reports have not made clear the extent of their influence.

[53] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941.

The French airforce in North Africa is estimated by the British to consist of three hundred seventy-one planes, by United States observers, of four hundred thirty-five. This force might be reenforced by three hundred twelve planes now located in unoccupied France. Practically all of these planes, however, are outmoded.

---

[54] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; State, Casablanca, June 25, 1941; State, Algiers, April 21, July 26, 1941.

[55] State, Algiers (Murphy), July 26, 1941; a U.P. correspondent stated in an interview (May 8, 1941) that 500,000 men were available (Rated "B").

[56] Reports of hidden arms, and even tanks, have been circulating frequently: State, Tunis, August 25, 1941; State, Algiers (Murphy) April 21, 1941; Military Attaché, Tangier, September 2, 1941; MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; State, Casablanca, June 28, 1941.

Moreover, they would suffer a rapid loss of efficiency, because of lack of fuel, spares, and bombstocks.[57] A further decrease in striking power would result from the anticipated German air attack on airdromes at the beginning of the campaign. Consequently, neither the French army nor the air force would be able to offer serious resistance to a German drive.

French resistance would also be weakened by some Fifth Column action. At the present time the number of Axis representatives in North Africa is not considerable. It is limited to the six to seven hundred members of the German-Italian Armistice Commission,[58] a still unknown number of consular officers now being sent in, some German business representatives, and possibly some undercover agents who have been successful in evading the surveillance of the French police.[59]

---

[57] See above p. 5.

[58] The numerical strength of the Armistice Commission has been estimated with great variations, probably because of frequent transfers of personnel. The latest available reports indicate the presence of 436 Italian Commissioners (Telegram, State, Algiers, Oct. 30, 1941).
Morocco: 7 officers, 6 N.C.O., 8 civilians.
Algeria: 82 officers, 157 N.C.O., 12 civilians.
Tunisia: 49 officers, 102 N.C.O., 13 civilians.
The German Commission as stated by Weygand consists of 266 men (Telegram, State, Algiers, Oct. 28, 1941), but other observers have suggested 247 (State, Algiers, Sept. 5, 1941), 209, and 193 members respectively.

[59] State, Algiers, Sept. 5, 1941. The existence of Gestapo offices in Spanish Morocco is well known, State, Tangier (Childs), September 4, 1941.

The influence of the members of the German-Italian Armistice Commission on the African population has been practically negligible. From the beginning the French Administration has aimed to be as strict as possible in curtailing the activities of the Commissioners to the letter of the Armistice agreements. Several times Noguès and others have gone out of their way to be stiff, if not disagreeable.[60] The French have made it widely known that any intercourse between residents of North Africa and the Armistice Commission is forbidden. Frenchmen who have been seen in the presence of one of these commissioners have been shipped home, natives have been sent to the southern provinces and nationals of other states have been given orders to leave.[61]

In spite of its numerical weakness and its present insulation, the Armistice Commission presents nevertheless a potential threat to the French. It has been staffed by men competent far beyond their formal function. And, despite a large number of shifts in personnel[62], a well-informed source asserts that many of the commissioners could serve as staff officers in a German expeditionary force, while others could maintain the efficient operation of air fields. In short, they represent a picked staff of military and technical experts of considerable value in case of German action in North Africa.

---

[60] State, Casablanca, September 9, 1941.

[61] State, Tangier, October 3, 1941; State, Casablanca, September 9, 1941; MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; State, Algiers, June 30, 1941.

[62] State, Algiers, September 5, 1941.

Moreover, the impending establishment of consulates in the near future with full consular powers and a complete staff will largely remove the barriers between the German officials and the residents of North Africa. It is reported that a German Consul General will reside at Casablanca and that others will be stationed at Fez, Marrakesh, Oran, Constantine, and Meknes or Rabat. There is also to be an Italian Consul General at Tunis.[63] From these consulates the Germans can organize the nationals of countries now under German control and the large Spanish and Italian population of North Africa; they can put pressure upon Frenchmen who have relatives in German prison camps and the occupied zone; they can encourage the work of French "collaborationists"; they can influence Moorish notables, and in general undermine the morale of French North Africa.[64]

Among the Europeans in French North Africa the Germans and Italians are bound to find many sympathizers.

---

[63] Telegram, State, Casablanca, November 2, 1941.

[64] Telegram, State, Casablanca, October 29, 1941.

According to the census of 1936 there were 283,783 non-French Europeans in North Africa, most of them Italians (about 125,000) and Spaniards (about 115,000), moreover, a large percentage of the 1,066,654 French citizens are naturalized French who have accepted French citizenship for the economic advantages it offered. This substantial block of people offers perhaps the best reservoir of potential fifth columnists that the Germans have yet had available.

Even among the French citizens-by-birth the Germans will be able to find many active sympathizers. Some large corporations have been judged as decidedly pro-German.[65] The old de la Roque and Doriot groups are still in action and their ideals are being strengthened by the propaganda of the new Légion Française des Anciens Combattants.[66] Many of the officials judged "unsound" by Vichy have been purged and replaced by men willing to follow any Vichy order.[67] Some of these men would probably consider all resistance to German power useless and work for a peaceful surrender of North Africa.[68]

---

[65] Report of a United Press correspondent, rated "B", mentions especially the Omnium Nord Africain.

[66] State, Algiers, December 7, 1940; State, Tunis, April 11, 1941; State, Algiers, September 12, 1941; State, Casablanca, June 28, 1941.

[67] State, Algiers, December 7, 1940; British report, August 31, 1941.

The amount of support which the Germans could expect from the natives is impossible to predict.[69] It is complicated by many local prejudices and hatreds. Support of the Arabs in Morocco and Algeria would antagonize the Berbers. The unpopularity of the Italians among many Moslems in Tunis might lead to a large-scale rising in case Italian troops would accompany the Germans.[70] Some of the local leaders hate the French to such a degree that they would support any change, while others realize that German or Italian tutelage would be much more severe than French.[71] In general, the natives have in the past and probably will in the future support the nearest and the strongest, and the Berbers of the hills will participate in any campaign which promises food, loot, and pay.[72]

---

[68] The reports on public opinion in French North Africa are most conflicting: One sourse (reported by State, Algiers, September 4, 1941) estimates that ten per cent of the population is collaborationist, twenty-five per cent indifferent, sixty-five per cent for Weygand against the Germans; others report ninety per cent of the workers, seventy-five per cent of the Civil Service as pro-British, with seventy-five per cent and fifty per cent of these ready for action. (State, Tunis, April 11, 1941). In September the masses in Algeria were considered indifferent to the war, at most only passively pro-British and pro-German, and above all without a realization of the national humiliation. (State, Algiers, Sept. 12, 1941). These estimates are rather difficult to reconcile.

[69] This account of native opinion is largely derived from the studies of the Near Eastern Section The Native Problem in North Africa and the British Empire Section The Native Population of French Morocco.

[70] Viollis, A., Notre Tunisie, Paris, 1939; Steer, G. L., A Date in the Desert, London, 1939.

[71] Accession 360, Interview, Tangier, not dated.

German propaganda would probably be more efficient among the Arabs than among the Berbers. The latter living in the hinterland are equally suspicious of all foreigners, but have at times supported the French for their pro-Berber policy. The Arabs, however, especially the educated town dwellers, have been the main instigators of either Pan-Arabism or local nationalist movements, whose propaganda led to bloody riots during the severe economic crisis of the thirties. The Germans could exploit not only the natural Arab feeling of revenge for these defeats, but also play upon the existing anti-semitism, the economic shortage "caused by the British blockade," and the existing admiration for the power of Germany.[73]

Up to the present time German propaganda has not proved very effective according to most authoritative reports.[74] The French have been able to keep the support of most of the natives by rigid policy control, bribes to influential leaders,[75] the relaxation of price control for Arab merchants,[76] and above all by the prestige of Weygand. It seems doubtful that this policy can be continued successfully after the opening of the German consulates. Already some of the native leaders are reported to be taking out "counter insurance".[77] Consequently Fifth Column support among the natives appears as easily developed as among the Europeans.[78]

---

[72] ISIS, Morocco, November, 1940.

[73] State, Algiers, July 6, 1941; Military Attaché, Tangier, July 22, 1941; State, Casablanca, June 28, 1941.

[74] MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941; Military Attaché, Tangier, September 13, 1941; State, Casablanca, June 19, 25, 1941. Other observers, however, have considered German propaganda a real danger: ISIS, Morocco, November, 1941; State, Casablanca, June 20, 28, 1941; Military Attaché, Tangier, June 22, 1941; State, Tangier, June 28, 1941; Accession 360, Tangier, interview.

Even without a Fifth Column, the military conquest of French North Africa would not be a difficult undertaking. The French say themselves that "French North Africa cannot resist a powerful offensive without prompt and adequate material aid from the outside."[79] They plan to meet a German attack by delaying actions only, trying to protect Casablanca and prevent the junction of the eastern and western pincers. After offering only small resistance to a German landing in Tunisia and Algeria, they expect to retreat into the mountains to threaten the main east-west highway at critical points. By these maneuvers they expected to prevent the junctions of the east and west forces for about fifteen days.

---

[75] State, Casablanca, June 18, 1941.

[76] Accession 364, Tangier, interview, August 31, 1941.

[77] State, Casablanca, June 18, 20, 1941; State, Tangier, July 5, 1941.

[78] Natives have already been reported to be trained as German propagandists in Paris. (Accession 364, Interview, August 31, 1941).

[79] A French General Staff report, included in MID Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941, outlines the French Strategy. See also State, Algiers, August 17, 1941.

This defensive plan, however, might not even be executed. Lack of military supplies as well as oil and gasoline is liable to cut the French campaign short. Fifth column actions might render important defensive highways and railroads unusable.[80] The expected bombing of the native quarters of North African cities could create riots serious enough to occupy most of the French forces.

Ruling out, however, these and possible other French difficulties, the conquest of North Africa can hardly be considered a difficult military campaign for the Germans. The French forces are fundamentally too weak to offer serious resistance.

---

[80] For example, the sabotage of electric plants would paralyze 431 miles of electrified railroad in Morocco. MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941.

to retreat into the mountains to threaten the main east-west highway at critical points. By these maneuvers they expected to prevent the junctions of the east and west forces for about fifteen days.

This defensive plan, however, might not even be executed. Lack of military supplies as well as oil and gasoline is liable to cut the French campaign short. Fifth column actions might render important defensive highways and railroads unusable.[80] The expected bombing of the native quarters of North African cities could create riots serious enough to occupy most of the French forces.

Ruling out, however, these and possible other French difficulties, the conquest of North Africa can hardly be considered a difficult military campaign for the Germans. The French forces are fundamentally too weak to offer serious resistance.

---

[80] For example, the sabotage of electric plants would paralyze 431 miles of electrified railroad in Morocco. MID, Survey of Northwest Africa, August 15, 1941.